THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

This paper examines main preconditions of acceptance and development of the RtoP conception and explains why it should be defined as a multi-disciplinary ＂route map＂, which, being based on the existent legal and politieal doctrines and rules and developing them, establishes the list of actions, which the states and the international community should undertake in cooperation with each other in order to protect populations from RtoP crimes.     

Hague Case Law — Latest Developments

Netherlands International Law Review -     

Terrorist sympathizers in The Netherlands

Abstract

The following remarks are excerpted from the 1987 Annual Conference on Domestic and International Terrorism sponsored by the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer Foundation of the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, in cooperation with the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York (SUNY) and the U.S. Global Strategy Council. The meeting was held on December 14, 1987 in Washington, D.C., and chaired by Professor Yonah Alexander of State University of New York and The George Washington University.     

Barriers to third‐party advertising in Canadian elections

A survey of public interest group leaders suggests some reasons why few third parties have chosen to advertise in recent elections. It indicates that public interest groups abstain from election advertising not because of the strictures of the Canada Elections Act but for other reasons, notably cost and fear of losing charitable status or of jeopardizing their access to and influence with officials. While the significance of these findings is limited by the scale of the survey, the results do raise tantalizing questions that warrant further research.     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.