Attitudes on the Size of Unemployment Benefits: Ideology and Numbers

The divide separating the political left from right is often expressed in specific numbers. The proper size of unemployment benefits is a key example of such a disagreement, with the left generally favoring higher levels of benefits than the right. However, little is currently known about how voters make up their mind on such policy relevant numbers. Using two survey experiments, this article shows that while Danish voters’ attitudes on unemployment benefits are correlated with their ideological position, they may also be strongly affected by the ways in which politically relevant numbers are presented and elicited. Specifically, when making up their minds on such numbers, voters are highly susceptible to anchoring effects and a unit effect. Furthermore, voters are affected more by precise numbers than by round numbers. Together, these results suggest that political actors may in some cases move public opinion closer to specific policy positions simply by presenting the relevant numbers in certain ways.     

On the Critique of Negotiated Economy

A critical debate on the concept of negotiated economy has to start from a mutual recognition of fundamental methodological and epistemological differences between the various research positions in the field. In reply to a recent critical comment by P. M. Christiansen on our use of the concept of negotiated economy, we argue that Christiansen not only mispresents our theoretical, empirical, and critical ambitions; most importantly, he also fails to grasp the basic methodological differences between our constructivist strategy of institutional analysis, and the more conventional non-constructivist approach that he propagates.     

Environmental Enforcement Undertakings and Possible Implications: Responsive,Smarter or Rent Seeking?

Enforcement undertakings have recently been added to the Environment Agency's list of mechanisms available for the enforcement of certain environmental offences. An enforcement undertaking is a written agreement between the regulator and the offender in which the offender proposes to undertake particular actions in relation to the relevant non‐compliant activity. This article examines the use of enforcement undertakings by the Environment Agency, arguing that the undertakings have significant regulatory implications and give rise to a series of possible problems. Notwithstanding this, the article concludes that enforcement undertakings possess a number of potentially positive features, making them a useful alternative to existing enforcement mechanisms.     

New Public Governance in the Baltic States: Flexible Administration and Rule Bending

Abstract

The New Public Governance approach advocates a more flexible and participatory public administration as means to higher efficiency and increased legitimacy. Increasing flexibility and thereby public employees’ discretion, however, may pose a risk to equality and impartiality, core values in democratic and rule-of-law societies. Using a survey among Baltic public employees, this article explores this risk. We ask whether public employees’ preferences for flexible rule application go hand in hand with acceptance of bending the rules, even if it means a breach of impartiality. We find that this is the case. We also find that contrary to what the New Public Governance approach expects, neither citizen participation nor generalized trust works as a control on rule bending. On a positive note, however, we find that control mechanisms associated with Weberian Public Administration lessen acceptance for bending the rules.     

Expecting something special? Developing assumptions of involvement organised interests as a source of regulatory quality in the European Union

Organised interests play a double role in policymaking: as representatives of societal interests and as policy experts adding to regulatory quality. The former of these 2 roles has been examined over and over again, whereas the latter has almost completely evaded scholarly interest for a number of reasons. One reason is that it demands a focus on output rather than on traditional darlings such as representation, input legitimacy, or influence. Another is that it demands an interdisciplinary approach as regulatory quality—that which the involvement of organised interests seek to furnish—is a concept that includes elements from both law and political science. The question of how to design involvement of organised interests in order to support regulatory quality, however, is a question with both academic and practical relevance. Building on an empirical study, this paper attempts to spur theorising to address this relevant question. The result is 4 assumptions that describe the relationship between involvement of organised interests and regulatory quality.     

How is Political Influence Redistributed in Times of Fiscal Austerity?

The distribution of political influence changes in times of fiscal austerity. Decision makers generally find themselves with more influence when the economy gets tighter, probably because more tough decisions must be made. In line with expectations based on the asymmetrical distribution of interests between budget guardians and advocates, however, some evidence can be found that the relative political influence shifts in the direction of the guardians when austerity becomes severe. These findings are based on a dataset consisting of a repeated cross‐sectional survey of the perception of political influence among local councillors in Denmark, combined with register data on austerity in the Danish municipalities. By moving the analytical level down to the subnational level, a contribution to the discussion on how austerity affects political influence can be made. Thus, it is not merely a practical saying that crisis opens for new political opportunities; it is now also a research agenda to investigate how this unfolds in different institutional settings.