Hooking Workers and Hooking Votes: Enganche,Suffrage, and Labor Market Dualism in Latin America

Labor market dualism—the segmentation of workers between formal, legally protected employment and informal, unprotected status—has long drawn attention from scholars and policymakers in Latin America. This article argues that lasting patterns of economic and political segmentation of workers arose earlier in the region's history than has previously been understood, well before the classic “incorporation” period. Late‐nineteenth‐century practices for the recruitment and retention of workers shaped Latin America's first sets of labor laws, most notably those governing union organization and individual worker job stability. Subsequently, these first laws served as important templates for development, constraining and conditioning the labor codes adopted under mass‐based politics. Using historical data drawn from Chile, Peru, and Argentina, this article shows how differing recruitment practices and variation in the extension of effective suffrage rights and electoral participation shaped early legal labor market segmentation and inequality in Latin America.     

The Complications of Colocation: What the Federal Communication’s Rule Making May Mean for Your Community

Abstract

You did it. You successfully worked with a wireless service provider to find the ideal spot for its new wireless tower. The tower is positioned perfectly—in the heart of downtown, yet safe, hidden, completely undisruptive. The provider is happy. The community is content. It’s a win‐win. Fast forward a month. The provider is back with a new idea: To support the latest technology and to enhance its revenues, it will add not one, but four 20‐foot extensions for new antennas. The extensions would make the otherwise hidden facility visible. They would reach across and over the sidewalk and street, presenting safety risks. And the provider would also add four new equipment cabinets and an equipment shelter. Your answer is easy: Absolutely not. We can find a better solution. But this time the provider is not asking, it’s demanding. It says that because it is not proposing an initial facility but a colocation, you must approve its requests. Whether the provider is correct may turn on how the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) resolves a pending rule making. This article describes the proceeding, key issues it raises, and what the proceeding may mean to you and your community. As a planner, you can influence the proceeding by meeting with the FCC to discuss the proposed rules and by responding to industry claims that local requirements are delaying deployment.     

Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War

Aerial bombardment has been an important component of counterinsurgency practice since shortly after it became a viable military technology in the early twentieth century. Due to the nature of insurgency, bombing frequently occurs in and around settled areas, and consequently it tends to generate many civilian casualties. However, the effectiveness of bombing civilian areas as a military tactic remains disputed. Using data disaggregated to the level of the smallest population unit and measured at multiple points in time, this article examines the effect of aerial bombardment on the pattern of local control in the Vietnam War. A variety of estimation methods, including instrumental variables and genetic matching, show that bombing civilians systematically shifted control in favor of the Viet Cong insurgents.     

Are Charitable Giving and Religious Attendance Complements or Substitutes? The Role of Measurement Error

Government policies sometimes cause unintended consequences for other potentially desirable behaviors. One such policy is the charitable tax deduction, which encourages charitable giving by allowing individuals to deduct giving from taxable income. Whether charitable giving and other desirable behaviors are complements or substitutes affect the welfare benefit of the deduction—complements increase the benefit, while substitutes decrease the benefit. This paper focuses on the effect of the deduction on one behavior in particular: religious attendance. Using data from the Independent Sector Survey of Giving and Volunteering, I estimate a tax price elasticity for religious attendance of ?0.4, which implies that charitable giving and religious attendance are complements. I resolve the difference between my estimate and a recent estimate by W. S. Gruber (2004) that implies charitable giving and religious attendance are substitutes. While Gruber imputes itemization status, an important factor in calculating tax incentives, I use survey‐reported itemization status. This imputation creates a large amount of non‐classical measurement error. I show that the measurement error is responsible for the disparate results: If I also impute itemization status, I obtain similar results as Gruber.