Reviews

Joseph M. van Brabant, Remaking Eastern Europe—On the Political Economy of Transition. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, xiv+223 pp., £57.00 h/b.

Ronald J. Hill, Communist Politics under the Knife: Surgery or Autopsy? London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990, 224 pp., £30.00 h/b; £9.95 p/b.

Andrei Akatovich Belykh, Istoriya sovetskikh ekonomiko‐matematicheskikh issledovanii. Leningrad University Press, 1990, 141 pp., 2 rubles.

Gregory Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR. Foreword by John N. Hazard. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1990, xiv+170 pp., £17.50 p/b.

James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, xiii+260 pp., £30.00

Joan Sokolovsky, Peasants and Power: State Autonomy and the Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, 181 pp., £18.95.

Louis Guy Michael, More Corn for Bessarabia: Russian Experience, 1910–1917. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1983, 245 pp., $18.95.

P. Pomper, Lenin, Trostsky and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, xiii+446 pp., $19.00 p/b.

Tony Cliff, Trotsky, 1923–27. Fighting the Rising Stalinist Bureaucracy. London: Bookmarks, 1991, 306 pp., £6.95 p/b.     

The evolving narrative of denial: the Fraser government and the Timorese genocide, 1975–1980

As research by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor documents, the years 1975–1980 constituted the worst period of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, during which grave human rights took place involving a high loss of life. In Australia, the government headed by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1975–1983) sought to present itself as a supporter of human rights and the international rule of law. It also prioritized relations with the Suharto regime, which it saw as key to its policy position in Southeast Asia. These two positions came into conflict due to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. The Fraser government therefore worked to propagate a narrative concerning East Timor which denied the seriousness of the situation, distorted the historical narrative, deflected blame from Indonesia, and depicted the Australian position as principled and realistic. This paper examines the development of this narrative as events progressed and information concerning the crisis in East Timor came to the attention of the outside world. It also examines how the Fraser government employed this narrative internationally in order to protect the Suharto regime from scrutiny.     

Perestroika and public choice: The economics of autocratic succession in a rent-seeking society

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Tucson, AZ, March 1990, and at the Austrian Economics Colloquium at New York University, September 1990. We would like to thank the participants at our session, and those at the Colloquium, for their comments and criticisms. In addition, Hal Hochman, Israel Kirzner, Mario Rizzo, Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, Gordon Tullock, and an anonymous referee provided useful comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

Mandate design and implementation: Enhancing implementation efforts and shaping regulatory styles

This research addresses the influence of mandate design upon implementation efforts and regulatory styles. Empirical analyses of these relationships are conducted for state-level land-use and development-management mandates enacted by California, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington. Three key findings provide insights about the role of mandate design in facilitating policy implementation. First, implementation efforts are more easily influenced than regulatory styles. Second, it is more difficult to foster conciliatory regulatory styles than it is to foster more legalistic styles. Third, a high degree of statutory coherence is not a necessary condition for strong implementation efforts. More generally, the findings show that policy designers can enhance implementation efforts and shape regulatory styles by altering key mandate features.     

Local Economic Development: What is Proposed, What is Done, and What Difference Does it Make?

This paper assesses the comparative policy insights gained from the articles in the symposium in terms of three dimensions: policies proposed, actions taken, and impacts scored. Local economic development interventions are classified in terms of a five-way categorization in terms of geographic breadth of action and reliance on complementary private action as a prerequisite to lasting impact. The nine symposium cases are then examined for their evidence on development efforts' accountability to the public and lessons about efficient use of public funds. The paper concludes that the cases demonstrate that most development efforts have wasted public funds, offering at best the limited success resulting from efforts to beggar neighboring local economics with which competition for development continues.     

Industry characteristics and interest group formation: An empirical study

The role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics. However, few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries. Using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries, we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics. In cross-sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables. Our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation. We discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy.For helpful comments, we would like to thank Antonio Estache, Bruce Gardner, Dennis Mueller, Mancur Olson, and participants at the meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Southern Economic Association. The International Institute of Management of Berlin, Paul Geroski, Neal Kennedy, Alexis Jacquemin, Kenneth Platto, Joachim Schwalbach, and Hideki Yamawaki helped in providing data. The Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland is acknowledged for provision of computational resources.