Citizens' Blame of Politicians for Public Service Failure: Experimental Evidence about Blame Reduction through Delegation and Contracting

Theories of blame suggest that contracting out public service delivery reduces citizens’ blame of politicians for service failure. The authors use an online experiment with 1,000 citizen participants to estimate the effects of information cues summarizing service delivery arrangements on citizens’ blame of English local government politicians for poor street maintenance. Participants were randomized to one of four cues: no information about service delivery arrangements, politicians’ involvement in managing delivery, delegation to a unit inside government managing delivery, and delegation through a contract with a private firm managing delivery. The politicians managing delivery cue raises blame compared to citizens having no information. However, the contract with a private firm cue does not reduce blame compared to either no information or the politicians managing delivery cue. Instead, the delegation to a unit inside government cue reduces blame compared to politicians managing delivery, suggesting that delegation to public managers, not contracting, reduces blame in this context.     

National Varieties of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs): A Comparative Analysis of PPP-Supporting Units in 19 European Countries

Most countries that have adopted the public–private partnership (PPP) model as a means of implementing infrastructure projects have launched dedicated supporting units to guide policy development and stimulate project implementation. This paper draws on the theoretical notion of PPP-enabling fields to carry out a comparative analysis of the roles and functions of PPP-supporting units across 19 European countries with varying PPP experiences. We distinguish four categories of national support of PPPs, from skeptical systems of zero support to full-fledged PPP systems. Furthermore, we take initial steps to analyze the possible link between national differences in institutionalized PPP support and the amount of implemented PPP projects. Finally, pathways for further research on PPP-supporting units are discussed.     

Inter-Agency Cooperation to Raise Awareness on Human Trafficking in Vietnam: Good Practices and Challenges

Awareness-raising tactics are arguably the first priority in the prevention strategies in Vietnam at present. Awareness-raising campaigns are implemented through two kinds of communication methods: community-based activities and mass media. Although anti-trafficking activities in Vietnam have achieved some successful results, recent evidence suggests that a lack of clear progress in the areas of trafficking awareness-raising still remains. The quality and extent of collaboration between authorised agencies are key factors in anti-trafficking activities, including raising awareness on human trafficking. However, to date, there has been no systematic research on inter-agency cooperation in awareness-raising activities in Vietnam. This paper first reviews the nature of human trafficking and legal framework on raising trafficking awareness in Vietnam. The paper then presents successes and challenges of current inter-agency collaborative activities undertaken to implement the awareness-raising strategies.     

The progress of the betting in a baseball game

The development of the Internet has led to the creation of countless new markets, among them, online, in-game betting markets for sporting contests. We examine the behavior of prices as events unfold in a baseball game. Specifically, we compare the evolution of prices during a game with probability estimates generated by an empirical model of scoring in baseball. We find that price changes correspond closely to changes in the probability of winning, for plays of both small and dramatic impact. Nevertheless, data limitations inhibit the ability to make strong claims regarding the hypothesis of efficient pricing.     

Public Value in Politics: A Legislative Budget Office Approach

We use Legislative Budget Offices (LBOs) as both a lens and a test of “public value in politics,” a facet of Moore’s original framework that remains its most contested. We identify two public value roles for LBOs: (1) as a normative-advisory institution, and (2) as a mechanistic-costing one. Through Moore’s Strategic Triangle, we contrast the higher public value contribution of the advisory role, as manifested in the United States, with the costings role as manifested in Canada. Our findings suggest that LBOs enhance both democracy and efficiency and thus show how “public value in politics” can be achieved.     

Public Value as Rhetoric: A Budgeting Approach

The public value theory has been accused of serving as a “rhetorical device” for public managers to advance their interests and influence vis-à-vis politicians. This article uses Legislative Budget Offices (LBOs) as a lens to re-examine the theme of “public value as rhetoric”. It examines how an LBO can relegate itself to a lower public value-creating position that avoids conflict with politicians, which then allows politicians to employ rhetoric such as fiscal “sustainability” and “responsibility”, without making actual budget choices that incur political costs. The findings of the article suggest that the use of public value as rhetoric is a function of contradictory values held by citizens, which politicians and public managers must reconcile by choosing to divert either resources or rhetoric. Furthermore, rhetoric is bidirectional, and employable not just by public managers, but by politicians as well.     

Developing an index of EX-POST parliamentary oversight of public finance

For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.

This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehensive index to measure ex-post oversight, by using more up-to-date data bases and by including more countries. We can partially confirm the emerging consensus that ex-post budget oversight is stronger in parliamentary – and especially Westminster – systems than in countries with other forms of government, thereby somewhat offsetting the previously identified weaknesses of Westminster parliaments in budget formulation.

When used in combination Wehner’s [2006. Assessing the power of the purse: An index of legislative budget institutions. Political Studies, 54, 767–785] index of ex-ante legislative oversight, this index provides a comprehensive picture of legislative power of the purse regarding the budget process.