Consensual Coalitions? Coalition Formation in Norwegian Municipalities

While widely applied to political coalitions in national assemblies and cabinets, theories of coalition formation have seldom been tested at the local level of government. This article presents a model of coalition formation in connection with mayoral elections in Norwegian local councils and tests it on the basis of the first systematic collection of data on the election of mayors from a large number of municipalities. It finds small significant effects on the probability that oversized coalitions will be formed. Contrary to "common" knowledge, the size of a municipality has a positive influence on the conflictual climate, and thus on the size of the coalitions formed, which implies that the probability that an oversized coalition will form is higher in a large than in a small municipality. It also finds that the possibility that an oversized coalition will form increases if one party controls a majority of the councilors on its own, and if the majority is non-socialistically controlled. The assumption of a strong norm for reaching consensus-based decisions, reinforced by the design of the local political institutions, is supported.     

Civil service reform in Uganda: Lessons learned

This article presents the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) in Uganda. It outlines the context in which the CSRP is being implemented and establishes the link between the CSRP and other reform programmes, particularly constitutional decentralization, liberalization/privatization and army demobilization. It also analyses the progress made so far, given certain obstacles, and attempts to assess and make some suggestions for the road ahead. The issues of civil service reform go beyond addressing the need for pay reform and improving organizational structure. While these are important pieces of the puzzle, they cannot stand alone. Issues of greater participation, transparency and accountability in decision making—all of which strangthen democratization—are also at stake. The aim of these reforms is to enable the state to function more rationally and effectively, as the duties it performs—as well as the country's needs—become more complex and varied. The overarching theme is to develop the state's own capacity in order to create sustainable reforms in the quest for long-term development. The close of the cold war has brought many changes. In recent years, for example, the international donor community has paid increasing attention to reform issues. It has called on recipient governments to participate in the design and implementation of these programmes. In recipient countries, the movement toward decentralization, privatization and commercialization of many government functions has increased the range of opportunities available to citizens. It has also brought demands for greater responsiveness on the part of the government and parastatal agencies. Moreover, in an era of dwindling aid budgets, donors are now seeking better value for their money, and they are less willing to excuse widespread graft and corruption on geopolitical grounds.     

What Makes Popular Government Self‐reinforcing?

This article explores the ongoing debate on whether popular government is a continually improving or a continually deteriorating constitutional principle in Scandinavian politics. In particular, three recent articles that address this question are reviewed. One puts an almost entirely positive light on developments in Denmark. By contrast, the authors of the articles on Sweden and Norway are less inclined to see any parallel between economic growth, a sustainable welfare state and good public finances, on the one hand, and improved popular government, on the other. The aim here is to bring some clarity into this paradoxical picture by distinguishing between popular government as such and the prerequisites for popular government's long-term legitimacy. What makes popular government self-reinforcing, this article concludes, is the underlying, more fruitful question to pose. This query should be brought into the open and answered.     

Organizational convenience for white-collar crime: opportunity expansion by offender behavior

The theory of convenience suggests that the extent of white-collar crime is dependent on financial motive, organizational opportunity, and willingness for deviant behavior. Organizational opportunity is at the core of convenience theory, where privileged and powerful offenders have legitimate access to resources in their professions to commit and conceal financial crime. This article introduces a dynamic perspective of organizational opportunity where a white-collar offender can cause opportunity expansion over time. Based on agency theory, social disorganization theory, and blame game theory, a case study is presented. The case study is concerned with a chief financial officer (CFO) who applied several opportunity expansion techniques before he conveniently was able to commit and conceal embezzlement in the business where he was employed.     

Advancing the Role of Social Mechanisms,Mediators, and Moderators in Securitization Theory: Explaining Security Policy Change in Japan

ABSTRACT

In this article, I further develop the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory in a causal direction, by emphasizing the explanatory family of mechanisms, mediators and moderators. In the first half of this article, I present two models for conceptualizing the causal maps that securitization is part of. Next, I define five epistemological and methodological dimensions that are important for modelling securitization with causal power. The proposed approach is then put into practice by two most-similar case studies in the second half of the article: securitization attempts in Japan in 2006-07 and in 2012-15. By comparing his securitization efforts in 2006 and in 2012-15 respectively, I identify why PM Abe was successful in his securitization attempt in the latter period. Furthermore, I propose an explanatory set that together with securitization enabled certain effects to take place in Japan, namely the introduction of collective self-defense in 2014/15.     

Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe

Abstract

This article investigates the importance of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as motivation for recent acts of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. It analyses the mass casualty terrorist attack attributed to a group of Islamist militants in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist network. The first case has been assumed to be mainly motivated by the Iraq war, whereas the other case has been perceived as an act by an individual, motivated by domestic factors in Holland. The article situates these acts of terrorism within the theory of so-called spillover effects from armed conflicts to international terrorism. It argues that the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists in both cases, but that the terrorists linked the Iraq issue with perceived injustices against Muslims in Europe and globally.     

How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?

This article examines, compares, and contrasts the ways in which “global jihadis” have trained for terrorism in Western Europe. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the terrorists received training in Al Qaeda paramilitary camps. After invasion, they had to find alternative training methods and arenas. It is widely assumed that the Internet has taken over the role of the Afghan camps. The current survey suggests that the Internet's role as a “virtual training camp” might be overstated. Although the Net has become an important tool for terrorists on many levels, they maintain an urge to obtain real-life, military-style training in jihadi combat zones. Despite difficulties and risks, many of today's terrorists attend terrorist training facilities in Pakistan or other places. The main characteristic of training practices after the invasion of Afghanistan seems to be that, from an organizational perspective, the push for training and preparation comes from “below” rather than from “above.”