Taking Your Academic Expertise Public: Lessons Learned Responding to the 11 September Crisis

The advantage of academic life is that society allows us to spend years reading things no one else reads, writing articles and books almost no one else reads, and traveling to places no one else travels to. But in times of crisis, when the totally unexpected becomes reality, society understandably expects that we serve our communities with knowledge, explanation, insights, and policy alternatives. The days, weeks, and months following the attacks of 11 September were such an occasion and many academics experienced sudden demands for public commentary and analysis. As international studies scholars, we have insights and knowledge that our communities require and desire, most notably in times of crisis. By responding to the best of our abilities, we are able to return something to society and help people understand more clearly the world in which we live. In this essay, we discuss how we handled this challenge in the wake of 11 September and the lessons we have learned through that process.     

The project orthodoxy in development: Re-evaluating the cutting edge

This paper takes a broad critical posture towards the project as an instrument of development. It addresses the multidimensional features of what has become the project orthodoxy in development management, and some of the attending effects. It suggests that some of the virtues of the project have been offset by a number of negative consequences as it has become institutionalized in the procedures of both donor agencies and national governments in developing countries. An attempt is made to distinguish between those kinds of activities in which the project mode is most useful, and those for which its basic features and attendant trappings have great limitations. The argument concludes with a reassertion of the need for better linkages with programme management and the sources of policy.     

The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs

This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties.