Federal dynamics in times of economic and financial crisis

The global economic and financial crisis is a challenge for all governments, but particularly for federal states because divided and/or shared territorial powers make federations susceptible to coordination problems in fiscal policy making. This article explores the effects of the ongoing crisis on federal relations. Three kinds of problems that may become the cause of federal tensions and conflicts are evoked: opportunism of subgovernments, centralisation and erosion of solidarity among members of the federation. Our analysis of fiscal policies and federal conflicts of 11 federations between 2007 and the present reveals three kinds of coordination problems: shirking in the use of federal government grants, rent‐seeking in equalisation payments, and over‐borrowing and over‐spending. Our results show that shirking remained limited to few cases and occurred only in the first part of the crisis. However, rent‐seeking and over‐borrowing and over‐spending led to a reduction of solidarity among subgovernments and to increased regulation of the fiscal discretion of the members of the federation. Subsequently, tensions in federal relations increased – although only in one case did this challenged the federal order.     

The Mandatory Bid Rule: Efficient,After All?

The mandatory bid rule has its origins in the UK and now applies throughout the EU and in many other jurisdictions. Under a mandatory bid, an acquirer of a controlling stake in a listed company has to offer to the remaining shareholders a buy‐out of their minority stakes at a price equal to the consideration received by the incumbent controller. While the rule warrants that no value‐destroying control transfers take place, it is often criticised for preventing value‐increasing transactions. This paper challenges some of the claims made by critics of mandatory bids. Highlighting the effects of synergy gains in private sale‐of‐control transactions, it is shown that mandatory bids prevent inefficient control transfers, where minority shareholder protection rules provide inadequate protection. Furthermore, mandatory bids help facilitate transfers to the most efficient bidders in multi‐bidder settings. The mandatory bid is justifiable, on economic grounds, in wider circumstances than is commonly assumed by law and economics scholars.     

Registered cartels in Austria: an overview

Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (J Political Econ 72:44–61, 1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustain collusion.     

EU accession and the hardening of soft budget constraints: some macro evidence

The hardening of soft budget constraints (SBCs) is a central element in transforming the economies of Central and Eastern Europe into market economies. This paper presents macro evidence on budget hardening of transition economies comparing the performance of EU accession countries relative to non-accession countries. We estimate SBC hardening for 21 transition economies in a partial adjustment model by measuring the reaction of employment to output changes over a 10-year period. The paper finds that accession candidates have reduced excess labour demand substantially relative to non-accession countries.

The relationship between childhood traumatic events,social support,and mental health problems in prisoners

This study examined the prevalence of childhood traumatic events (CTE), social support levels as well as mental health problems (MHP), to test for differences between traumatized and non-traumatized individuals, and to investigate the relationship among the aforementioned parameters in a sample of 49 prisoners in Switzerland. This cross-sectional study used standardized self-report measurements. In line with expectations, prisoners reported a high rate of traumatic events. Furthermore, results indicated that those traumatized differed from those non-traumatized regarding the level of social support, interpersonal sensitivity, and depression. However, no relationship between CTE and social support as well as MHP was found. This points to specific therapeutic needs of those traumatized, and to the necessity of a trauma-informed correctional care. Moreover, these study results are a further step into more integrated models of criminal behavior.     

There is no “point” in decision-making: a model of transactive rationality for public policy and administration

The hope that policy-making is a rational process lies at the heart of policy science and democratic practice. However, what constitutes rationality is not clear. In policy deliberations, scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological concerns are often at odds. Harold Lasswell, in instituting the contemporary policy sciences, found that John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy provided an integrative foundation that took into account all these considerations. As the policy sciences developed with a predominantly empirical focus on discrete aspects of policy-making, this holistic perspective was lost for a while. Contemporary theorists are reclaiming pragmatist philosophy as a framework for public policy and administration. In this article, key postulates of pragmatist philosophy are transposed to policy science by developing a new theoretical model of transactive rationality. This model is developed in light of current policy analyses, and against the backdrop of three classical policy science theories of rationality: linear and bounded rationalism; incrementalism; and mixed-scanning. Transactive rationality is a “fourth approach” that, by integrating scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological considerations, serves as a more holistic, explanatory, and normative guide for public policy and democratic practice.     

Multilevel governance and problem‐solving: Towards a dynamic theory of multilevel policy‐making?

In this article, we suggest that the governance of problems shapes the institutional dynamics of multilevel governance (MLG) polities. MLG arrangements—processes and institutions that enable policy‐making across different jurisdictional levels wherein both public authorities and non‐state actors are involved—can or cannot succeed in solving policy problems and at the same time they could create new problems. We argue that the problem‐solving capacity and problem‐generating potential of multilevel arrangements can result in further, downwards, upwards or sideways delegation of political authority, which in turn reconfigure the multilevel architecture of the political system following either centripetal or centrifugal tendencies. We illustrate our point with a stylized account of the dynamics of MLG in the European Union (EU) since the early 1990s. We conclude with some remarks about developing a more general theory of multilevel policy‐making.