全文获取类型
收费全文 | 152篇 |
免费 | 11篇 |
专业分类
各国政治 | 17篇 |
工人农民 | 3篇 |
世界政治 | 18篇 |
外交国际关系 | 13篇 |
法律 | 75篇 |
政治理论 | 33篇 |
综合类 | 4篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 1篇 |
2020年 | 6篇 |
2019年 | 4篇 |
2018年 | 3篇 |
2017年 | 11篇 |
2016年 | 6篇 |
2015年 | 8篇 |
2014年 | 2篇 |
2013年 | 25篇 |
2012年 | 6篇 |
2011年 | 4篇 |
2010年 | 6篇 |
2008年 | 8篇 |
2007年 | 10篇 |
2006年 | 8篇 |
2005年 | 3篇 |
2004年 | 11篇 |
2003年 | 4篇 |
2002年 | 7篇 |
2001年 | 4篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 6篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有163条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
101.
Philippe C. Schmitter 《Journal of Chinese Political Science》2018,23(1):33-46
The role of elites and their policies in the process of regime transformation are not as simple as “rule by the people” implies, once it is recognized that all “real-existing democracies” depend crucially on the role of representatives who act as intermediaries between the citizens and their rulers. Instead of rule by a few vs. rule by all, we have “rule by some politicians” as the outcome. These newly empowered representatives inevitably form an elite institutionally separate from the electorate that has chosen them competitively or the selectorate that has chosen them for their reputation. 相似文献
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
Philippe Braud 《Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)》1997,32(3):112-123
The decline of confidence in the institutions of European democracy constitutes a phenomenon requiring investigation of the factors behind this discontent. Both civic perceptions and the erosion, of fundamental beliefs contribute to hypothesizing about attempts at “constructing meaning.” This leads in turn to a consideration of quasimissionary institutions and to the resultant effects of indifference in the contemporary world. 相似文献
107.
Honesty in Environmental Compliance Games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This note investigates the consequences of honesty in a compliance game involving polluting firms and an environmental agency. Two enforcement schemes with or without self-reporting of behavior are considered. First, we show that non intervention may become optimal when the proportion of honest polluters is large enough but still inferior to one. Secondly, the increase in the number of honest polluters has striking ambiguous effects on pollution and social welfare. Indeed, we give examples in which an increase in the proportion of honest polluters leads to an increase in the number of non compliant polluters or a decrease in social welfare. 相似文献
108.
109.
110.