VICTORIA

The first half of 1979 saw a continued effort by government to rationalize departmental responsibilities and policies. In the field of human services the government established the Health Commission and the Community Welfare Services Department (discussed in more detail in the two previous Chronicles) and has responded to one of the major contemporary social issues by establishing a Victorian Employment Committee.     

Examining the Canadian Government's Resistance to Including Socioeconomic Concerns in Genetically Modified Seeds Regulation: A Policy Transfer and Multilevel Approach

In 2011, Canadian Members of Parliament refused to transfer a regulatory initiative taken from Argentina that would have required an analysis of potential harm to export markets before authorizing the sale of any new genetically modified seed. This was the purpose of Bill C‐474, which was defeated in the House of Commons. After exploring Argentina's regulatory framework as a source of transfer, this paper combines a multilevel analysis with a typology of policy transfer mechanisms in order to address the complexities underlying this unsuccessful attempt. We explore how the mechanisms of competition and coercion might have impeded the transfer of such an initiative at the international and the macro‐state levels. Moreover, while a policy transfer network in support of the bill called on previous experiences with genetically modified seeds, their efforts appear to have been outweighed by another network using arguments based on the mechanisms of competition, coercion, and mimicry.     

Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy

Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This article proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These nonpecuniary costs imply that campaigns influence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk. They influence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously—but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we find that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important benefits beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.     

Transition to the single currency in europe and its implications for financial institutions

This paper discusses the changeover to single currency in the European Union and provides a preliminary analysis of the timing and nature of the steps to be taken by financial institutions. It uses data from the literature and a recent survey of financial institutions operating in Europe to provide an overall view on conversion issues that both these institutions and policy-makers are facing. This paper could therefore serve as a background for future studies that pertain to the strategies of individual financial institutions, their competitive positioning for the long term, and their attempts to minimize their cost of conversion in the short term. The European Currency Unit, by virtue of its design, is a viable candidate for use as the single currency. Its current status in member countries shows that it meets the basic “money” criteria but that legal obstacles have kept it from wider use. However, these legal obstacles are being lifted. Financial institutions should start planning for potential implementation problems. The analysis of conversion costs categorized by product/service and by function shows that the move to single currency requires financial institutions to modify selected functions within a very short period of time. A lengthy dual currency period on all functions would cause duplication of efforts and large losses to banks. There are other intangible costs and benefits that are social and political, which are associated with the changeover. These are touched upon and discussed briefly in the context of the motivation behind the European Monetary Union.