Section 47 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013: A Flawed Reform of the UK Cartel Offence

On 1 April 2014, section 47 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA) entered into force, ensuring significant changes to the UK cartel offence. The criminal offence, contained in section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002, was enacted to secure the deterrence of cartel activity affecting the UK. Following almost ten years of enforcement, the cartel offence had failed to live up to expectations. Consequently, following a public consultation, it was reformed in substance. Section 47 ERRA, removed the (controversial) definitional element of ‘dishonesty’ from the offence, created a number of ‘carve outs’ from the offence, and created three additional defences. This article examines in detail the specific reforms of the cartel offence and argues that, although considerable improvement has been made, the UK offence is fundamentally flawed and unworkable in practice. Further reform is therefore advised.     

The Kretschmann Effect: Personalisation and the March 2016 Länder Elections

This paper examines the influences of candidate perceptions on Germany’s spring 2016 Länder election results. It takes a comparative approach, using a modified Michigan model on the data collected simultaneously in three Länder (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt). It explains why the Green party was successful in Baden-Württemberg but not in the other Länder, the impact of the major candidates, and what distinguishes the influences of the current prime ministers running for these elections. Whereas Winfried Kretschmann’s (Green party, Baden-Württemberg) high impact on the election results was driven mainly by a warmth dimension (sympathy), Malu Dreyer (SPD, Rhineland-Palatinate) was viewed as being competent. Both candidates were assets to their parties and co-responsible for the results. In comparison, in Saxony-Anhalt, none of the candidates were as important to the outcomes of the electoral success.     

Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country’s bargaining power. Powerful countries underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure the necessary technology investments.