Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien

The last quarter of the 20^th century saw the worldwide advance of democracy. However, almost three decades after the beginning of the third wave of democratization, the empirical evidence increasingly suggests that this wave could become less a triumph of political liberalism and much more a success story for a “defective” form of democracy. The mainstream of theoretical and empirical ‘consolidology’ speaks of democracies and autocracies. This crude dichotomy does not allow for more differentiated judgments and conceptualizations of the structural and functional elements of this regime-type that has developed in the grey area between consolidated, liberal democracy and open autocracy. Thus far, a theoretical concept enabling the new regime-type to be systematically differentiated from democracies based on the rule of law, the reasons for its emergence to be clearly set out, and the specific dynamics of its development to be explained, has thus far been lacking. To overcome this shortcomings this article presents a multidimensional concept of democracy that allows, to distinguish between liberal democracies based on the rule of law and defective, or illiberal, democracies. From developing a three-dimensional typology for classifying three subtypes of defective democracies (exclusive democracy, tutelary democracy, illiberal democracy), the paper is focused on the illiberal democracy, more specifically on the questions what are the defining characteristics of illiberal democracies, and what are the reasons for their emergence. We will examine the specific interdependence of formal institutions and informal institutional arrangements, which we consider to be one of the central features of illiberal democracies and, finally, we will outline possible scenarios for the future development of illiberal democracies.     

Zur Bedeutung „transnationalen Sozialkapitals“: Sind Grenzgebiete Laboratorien sozialer Integration in Europa?

The article focuses on transnational relations in border regions. Social capital theory assumes that in border regions special opportunity structures exist for the social integration of the population of old and new member states of the European Union based on the specific possibilities for cross-border cooperation. Border regions may be seen as “laboratories of social integration”. The article discusses whether “transnational social capital” actually develops and to what extent it adds to the social integration of the regions and of Europe. Representative survey data from the German-Polish, German-Czech, and German-French border regions – gathered on both sides of the border – serve as the basis of the analysis. Results show that currently – especially on the old outer borders of the EU – the accumulated transnational social capital adds very little to social integration at the regional and European level.     

Representation and Austerity Politics: Attitudes of Greek Voters and Elites Compared

Drawing on surveys of voters and MPs in Greece, this article analyses elite–mass interaction on key policy (austerity, European integration, immigration) and ideological issues after the 2012 elections. We find that while for the government parties, New Democracy and PASOK, the level of congruence is quite high, MPs from opposition parties (SYRIZA, Golden Dawn) place themselves in more exposed positions in comparison with their voters. The observed substantial variation in the intensity and direction of congruence, across parties and issue preferences in Greece, reinforces the view that the dimensionality of political contestation is not reducible to a single ideological dimension.     

Wie lässt sich Demokratie am besten messen? Zum Forumsbeitrag von Thomas Müller und Susanne Pickel

Ohne Zusammenfassung * Die vier Autor(inn)en arbeiten in einem gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekt des NCCR Democracy (vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds finanziertes National Centre of Competence in Research: Challenges to Democracy in the 21^st Century) und des WZB an einem „Demokratiebarometer“ für die 30 OECD-Staaten, das die Ignoranz der 0-Varianz bei Polity und Freedom House aufkl?ren will.

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