Why noncompetitive states are so important for understanding the outcomes of competitive elections: the Electoral College 1868–2016

Brams and Kilgour (Public Choice 170:99–113, 2017) begin their recent essay on the Electoral College (EC) by pointing out the obvious, but nonetheless regularly neglected fact that noncompetitive states may have a decisive impact on EC outcomes and shape the electoral strategies of the candidates in the competitive states, especially if there is asymmetry in the partisan balances in the non-competitive states. Their contribution is to offer combinatorics insights into the implications of such asymmetries in the form of three new indicators: Winningness, Vulnerability, and Fragility. They then explore the magnitude and effects of these three measures for the presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. The major contribution of this note is to extend their analyses of these measures to an additional 34 elections: every election in the modern two-party post-Civil War era from 1868 to 2016. We find the Winningness measure to predict very well over the entire set of 38 presidential elections. Inspired by their work, we also offer a new and simpler metric for partisan asymmetries in noncompetitive states and show how it can predict the expected closeness of EC outcomes as well or better than the more complex combinatorics measures they propose.     

A taxonomy of runoff methods

We look at ways of classifying runoff methods in terms of characteristics such as number of rounds, rules used to determine which candidates advance to the next round, and rules which determine the final winner. We also compare runoffs and so-called instant runoffs such as the alternative vote.     

论合法性与政治协商

本文主要的意图是根据对卢梭、罗尔斯和西耶斯等理论的分析,探讨合法性基础的建构问题。作者认为,作为合法性基础的不是每个人的确定性意志,而是他们决定意志的过程,即政治协商的过程。虽然协商理论仅仅提供了一种不完善的、尽可能合理地做出决策的方式,但是,这种过程使理性结果的实现更加可能。     

Why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great (or even greater) in competitive seats as in non-competitive ones

Basic Downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two-candidate elections. Common journalistic wisdom, moreover, leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close. Yet, the available evidence from the US Congress disconfirms this prediction. To explain this counterintuitive result, we develop a spatial model that allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competition, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout that can lead office-seeking candidates, especially candidates in close elections, to emphasize policy appeals to their voter base rather than courting the median voter.     

Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent

In The Calculus of Consent (1962: 235) Buchanan and Tullock assert: (1)?ceteris paribus, while a coalition controlling less than a majority of voters may control in either chamber, the greater the difference in the bases of representation in the two houses, the less likely is any given coalition of voters to control a majority of the seats in both chambers; (2)?the potential of cross-chamber logrolls (on issues of unequal intensity) increases the likelihood that a minority may effectively control policy making. We link these ideas to social theory approaches to bicameralism and for the empirical study of legislatures.     

Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not

Though few voters appear to hold consistent ideological views, the roll call votes of congressmen and senators can be well predicted by ideological terms. An explanation for this puzzle is that ideology allows candidates to succinctly explain their views. Because it is difficult to explain detailed positions to voters, a candidate who presents his position in ideological terms may be able to defeat a candidate who supports a set of issue positions that would, in toto, be preferred by a majority of well-informed voters were the voters aware of all the views of that candidate. This effect can be a powerful one. Moreover, ideology may be a source of electoral stability, and a means of providing regularity and structure to elite political debate.Amihai Glazer acknowledges support from the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. Bernard Grofman received partial support from Grant SES #85-06376, Decision and Management Science Program, National Science Foundation, and NSF Grant BNS #80-01194 to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, at which he was a 1985–86 Fellow. We are indebted to Gordon Tullock for his comments.     

Privatisation and regulation in an Asian transitional economy: the case of Mongolia

Mongolia's transition to a market economy has entailed rapid and extensive privatisation accompanied by, inter alia, stabilisation, liberalisation and de‐regulation. The primary objective of this strategy was to cement the new political and economic order. Little weight was given to the problems created by the privatisation programme and only limited consideration given to questions of regulation in the economic, social and environmental spheres. However, the failure of the economy to translate economic growth into poverty reduction and the acceleration of the privatisation programme, which includes the progressive transfer of land, and proposals to privatise health, educational and cultural assets, have made regulation a more pressing issue. New, powerful social classes and interest groups have emerged, which have contributed to regulatory failure and capture and have undermined public policy. We identify a range of issues relating to privatisation and regulation and discuss the degree to which they are being addressed by the post‐1990 political class. Although there exist a number of regulatory agencies, there is a lack of political commitment, and only piecemeal implementation and enforcement. The scarcity of experienced and technically competent staff capable of establishing and operating effective regulatory agencies and ensuring compliance is also a major problem. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.