A transaction-based approach to policy intervention

A transaction-based approach to policy intervention is presented. The approach overcomes a number of weaknesses in current approaches to policy intervention. The approach involves three main conceptual elements: transactions, transaction governance mechanisms, and governance principles. The transaction is taken to be the basic unit of analysis. Profiles of transactions vary along a number of transaction dimensions. Transaction governance mechanisms - such as, for example, government service, regulation, contracts, vouchers, markets, taxes, and self-service - are each suitable for governing transactions having particular profiles. A mechanism will fail when used to govern transactions not fitting the profile. Governance principles are criteria or expectations - for example, efficiency, justice and liberty - used to judge how well a mechanism fulfills or achieves important societal goals. Specific choices of governance mechanisms (from the set that are technically feasible) therefore should be made according to how well they satisfy these governance principles. Public high school education is used as an example to illustrate the approach. A number of conclusions are offered.This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Public Administration Portland, Oregon, April, 1988.     

Diversity in the American States: Updating the Sullivan Index

The index of socioeconomic and cultural diversity among theAmerican states formulated by John L. Sullivan for 1960 is recreatedfor 1980. Comparisons are made between the index for the twotime periods, and changes among the states are examined overtime. Significant differences continue to exist between northernand southern states, mainly because of cultural rather thansocioeconomic factors. The diversity index remains a relativelypowerful predictor of policy variation among the states and,as such, might be considered as a substitute for geographicregion in comparative state policy research.     

'The Form Most Eligible': Liberty in the Constitutional Convention

Although the framers of the U.S. Constitution agreed that thefirst principles stated by the Declaration of Independence werefundamental, they thought that the form which freedom shouldtake within the Constitution could not be discovered by a resortto natural rights (and thus declined to affix a bill of rightsto the Constitution). They rejected both the view that libertyis independence (whether of individuals or of states) and theview that liberty is equivalent to the rule of the people. Instead,they held a political view of freedom in which liberty is understoodas the scope men have for political action. The institutionsthey designed direct the use of liberty to the common good.In light of this analysis, the issue of whether the Constitution'sprovisions concerning slavery and its treatment of women areindications of an inadequate view of liberty can be answeredin the negative.     

Books in review

A former editor of theAmerican Historical Review, he has written extensively on the history of modern Great Britain and more recently has published essays on the nature of the contemporary urban university.     

The economic approach to political behavior: Governors,bureaucrats, and cost commissions

Cost control commissions provide two primary types of recommendations: widespread benefits-widespread costs and widespread benefits-narrow costs. Both types of recommendations are not of the form predicted by the standard economic models of political behavior. The paper explores why governors sanction these commissions and the types of recommendations governors will accept. Legislators use the maxim of concentrate benefits-spread costs to maximize votes. Governors, however, face a lower return to concentrated benefit policies and a lower cost from concentrated cost policies. This leads a governor to favor at the margin, policies which have widespread benefit-widespread cost or widespread benefit-concentrated cost. Evidence from 5 state cost control commissions support the difference between the politicians. The cost control commissions sanctioned by governors have proposed recommendations of the widespread benefit-widespread cost and widespread benefit-concentrated cost form. Governors accepted approximately two-thirds of the widespread benefit-concentrated cost proposals, although they were more likely to accept recommendations of the widespread benefit-widespread cost nature. Recommendations which required legislative approval saw a lower likelihood of acceptance. This is consistent with the view that legislators prefer concentrated to widespread benefit recommendations. qu][The politician's] favorite strategy is to create a commission to study a problem and make recommendations that may then be used as political cover. Call it government by commission.     

Cycle avoiding trajectories,strategic agendas,and the duality of memory and foresight: An informal exposition

This paper considers the notion of cycle avoiding trajectories in majority voting tournaments and shows that they underlie and guide several apparently disparate voting processes. The set of alternatives that are maximal with respect to such trajectories constitutes a new solution set of considerable significance. It may be dubbed the Banks set, in recognition of the important paper by Banks (1985) that first made use of this set. The purpose of this paper is to informally demonstrate that the Banks set is a solution set of broad relevance for understanding group decision making in both cooperative and non-cooperative settings and under both sincere and sophisticated voting. In addition, we show how sincere and sophisticated voting processes can be viewed as mirror images of one another — embodying respectively, “dmemory” and “foresight.” We also show how to develop the idea of a “sophisticated agenda,” one in which the choice of what alternatives to propose is itself a matter of strategic calculation.     

PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON*

Voter turnout in the United States is much lower than in almost all other democratic countries. This has been interpreted as a symptom of popular alienation from the political system, suspicion of politicians, and pessimism about the consequences of political activity. When these perspectives are measured directly, however, it is clear that Americans score very low on almost every item. Indeed, there is no relationship between political con- tentment and turnout. Turnout does not reflect international variations in acceptance of politicians or the political system. Rather, it responds to variations in the bureaucratic steps required to cast a ballot. The United States is one of a handful of countries that require a separate step–registra- tion–before the citizen can vote; and with the partial exception of France it is the only country in which the individual rather than the state bears the responsibility for registration.