The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions

We provide a formal model illustrating the mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. Corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls because corruption reduces a government’s ability to collect tax revenue. If controls exist, however, individuals try to mitigate the burden by offering bribes, thereby increasing corruption. We test the model using panel data for 80 countries over the period 1984–2002 and find that corruption and restrictions indeed affect each other. Government’s attempts to increase revenue via controls on capital might thus invoke a restrictions-rent-seeking spiral with destructively high levels of both. Using capital controls to increase revenue should be reconsidered.     

Policy dynamics and the evolution of state charter school laws

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) showed how radically new policies emerge on government agendas as a consequence of exogenous shocks to policy subsystems displacing privileged interests. But how do these policies evolve post-punctuation? In this paper, we present three different models of policy change. Policies may revert to the old status quo if displaced interests re-assert themselves, or they may be “locked-in” by new interests now reaping the benefits. Alternatively, they may incrementally change as lawmakers “learn” how to better meet target population needs, particularly by witnessing how other jurisdictions address similar problems. We test these models with data on change in state charter schools laws over time. We find that whether old status quos are overthrow, and the fate of charter policies when they are enacted, is influenced more by competing political interests, especially interest groups, than elite and public perceptions of broad systemic crises. Yet, we also find that changing demands on the state and learning from the successes and failures of neighboring states also play significant roles.     

The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation

According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and "infect" neighboring countries, increasing or decreasing their democracy in turn. Using spatial econometrics and panel data that cover over 130 countries between 1850 and 2000, this article empirically investigates the democratic domino theory. We find that democratic dominoes do in fact fall as the theory contends. However, these dominoes fall significantly "lighter" than the importance of this model suggests. Countries "catch" only about 11% of the increases or decreases in their average geographic neighbors' increases or decreases in democracy. This finding has potentially important foreign policy implications. The "lightness" with which democratic dominoes fall suggests that even if foreign military intervention aimed at promoting democracy in undemocratic countries succeeds in democratizing these nations, intervention is likely to have only a small effect on democracy in their broader regions.     

Does economic freedom cause prosperity? An IV approach

A positive, statistical and economic significant relation between growth, income level and the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index has been amply documented. Most analyses, however, use OLS methods which, in the presence of endogenous variables do not establish causality and produce biased and inconsistent estimates. This paper uncovers the exogenous component of EFW using IV methods and finds a robust channel from economic freedom to prosperity. The findings, including instrument validity tests, support the importance of policies and institutions for development and warrants policy advice aimed at increasing economic freedom to foster prosperity.     

The effects of NBPTS‐certified teachers on student achievement

In this study, we consider the efficacy of a relatively new and widely accepted certification system for teachers established by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). We utilize an extensive database covering the universe of teachers and students in Florida for a four‐year span to determine the relationship between NBPTS certification and the impact of teachers on student test scores from both low‐stakes and high‐stakes exams. Contrary to some previous studies, we find evidence that NBPTS certification provides a positive signal of a teacher's contribution to student achievement only in a few isolated cases. However, our results do reinforce evidence from previous research that the process of becoming NBPTS certified does not increase teacher productivity. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Dynamic Representation(s): Federal Criminal Justice Policy and an Alternative Dimension of Public Mood

Does public policy respond to public opinion? Previous research suggests dynamic representation occurs in the aggregate. Yet, most of the evidence for policy response is limited to the policy intentions of elected officials on issues related to more or less government spending. We examine policy response to an alternative dimension of public mood, public preferences for more or less punitive criminal justice policies, using multiple indicators of policy from various stages of the policy-making process. Criminal justice policy should be responsive to public preferences given the public’s concern about crime and the negative social construction of criminals. Thus, there is an electoral incentive for public officials to respond to public preferences along this alternative dimension of public sentiment regarding criminal justice policy. We estimate a DYMIMIC model of federal criminal justice policy as a function of the multiple dimensions of public policy mood using Kalman filtering. The results indicate that criminal justice policy responds to the second, not the first, dimension of public mood. We find evidence that policy-makers at multiple stages of the policy process are able to differentiate among multiple signals from the public and respond appropriately. The results present a more sophisticated portrait of democratic responsiveness.     

Tribute to Richard E. Zody

Public budgeting is multifaceted. It draws from areas of study and practice ranging from management to administration to planning. Guided by analysis—enhanced by computational and technical advances—and political systems, it overlays the public sector at every level of government, including local, state, national, and international. It is also the domain of both academics and practitioners. This tribute honors Richard E. Zody by focusing on the multifaceted nature of public budgeting to reflect the career of a man committed to many of these dimensions. The central focus of his career was on improving public budgetary and management systems, and in doing so, he deftly drew from the many dimensions of budgeting. Dick demonstrated in his study, writing, teaching, and application an intellectual interest in two particular themes: the relationship between academics and practitioners; and budgeting and management, which includes the use of analytical skill and strategic planning. Through these interests, Dick impacted many lives.     

David Riesman and <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Lonely Crowd</Emphasis>

The reception of David Riesman’s classic sociological work The Lonely Crowd exemplifies both the possibilities and perils of the work of public intellectuals. The book was almost universally misread as a paean to inner-direction, and a lament upon the decline of the independent American spirit. But it was something rather more different, and more complex, than either of these things.     

Social Science and the Public Interest

Social Science and the Public Interest

Social Science and the Public Interest November/December 2009     

The Bureaucratic Politics of Welfare-State Crisis: Sweden in the 1990s

This article suggests that key bureaucrats play a decisive role in times of welfare crisis. It argues that key bureaucrats, through their advice, define both the type of welfare crisis and the range of possible solutions, which have at least two important consequences: First, it broadens the distribution of welfare cuts, as key bureaucrats—contrary to politicians—have no interests in targeting special voter groups. Second, it enables political compromises, as both the government and the opposition trust the key bureaucrats' expertise. These suggestions are tested empirically in a case study of Sweden in the 1990s. It shows that key bureaucrats did indeed influence both the distribution of the cuts and enabled a compromise between the center-right government and the Social Democratic opposition.