The Role of Management and Representation in Improving Performance of Disadvantaged Students: An Application of Bum Phillips's “Don Shula Rule”1

Scholars and practitioners within the U.S. education system have focused considerable attention on developing new programs aimed at raising educational achievement for disadvantaged students. New programs are only one way to improve student performance, however; recent work in public administration suggests that public management and implementation practices might also have a large impact on student performance. Existing research shows that managerial networking, managerial quality, and effective personnel management can significantly improve the quality of the education received by disadvantaged students. Additional work highlights the contribution of representative bureaucracy. Because these research agendas have targeted the public administration literature rather than the education policy literature, this article seeks to bring this research back to education policy. Using data from several hundred Texas public school districts, spanning 1995 to 2002, and focusing on disadvantaged student performance (Latinos, blacks, and low‐income students), this article illustrates how both management and processes to enhance the representativeness of teaching faculty produce benefits for disadvantaged students.     

Solving Problems

IN the late 1970s, Chinese uni-versities reopened after a 10-yearhiatus during the "cultural revolu-tion." Back then, students werethrilled to have the opportunityof college education that had been de-nied to so many of their elder brothersand sisters, and elation was the prevalentmood on campus. A quarter of a centurylater, the picture is very different. Facingleaner prospects in a highly competitivejob market, the heavy responsibilities ofan only child, and a range of other socialand econom…     

New Playgrounds for ＂Little Emperors＂

Wealth and Western influence are among the factors behind an emerging group of pleasure-seeking Chinese youths. STEREOTYPICALLY, a Chinese youngster studies long hours, obeys his parents and is righteousness personified. Kids that shoot pool, chainsmoke cigarettes and listen to expletive-loaded rap music are meanwhile     

规则制定与行政程序法

规则与规则制定是美国联邦行政程序法中确定的一个重要的政府规制工具,本文对规则制定的发展史作了一个简要的回顾,对其实施过程中产生的问题作了分析与评估,并对其未来发展以及行政程序法的实施作了展望,对于我们了解规则制定与美国联邦行政程序法具有较大的作用。     

The governance of children with disabilities and their families: Charting the public‐sector regime in Canada

Abstract: This article discusses governance and accountability structures that relate to the contemporary agenda of inclusion for children with disabilities in Canada. Who are the major public‐sector actors in policies for children with disabilities and their families? What governance roles does the sector perform? What are the defining trends that characterize the sector in the present age? The scope of the analysis is a broad scan of structures and roles rather than a detailed inventory of programs. Three clusters of governing activities are addressed: policy planning, consultation and coordination; creating structures, allocating resources and delivering services; and accountability roles and processes. Each of the clusters is examined in relation to public‐sector organizations general to government and to organizations specific to child and family and to disability issues. The education, health‐care and social‐service sectors are profiled to identify important trends and issues in the governance of Canadian disability policy. A concern of the public sector's governance regime for children with disabilities and their families is the absence of clear, consistent and central accountability mechanisms. There is a déjà vu discourse on disability reform, a strong sense that we have been here before. Among other factors, this frustrating pace of reform is due to bureaucratic factors and weak accountability mechanisms. To overcome this déjà vu, the author calls for the adoption of a more inclusive and integrated governance regime for the disability policy domain. Sommaire: Le prdéjàsent article porte sur les structures de gouvernance et de reddition de comptes concernant le programme aduel d'inclusion des enfants handicapés au Canada. Qui sont les principaux acteurs du secteur public responsables des politiques pour les enfants handicapés et leurs familles ? Quels rôles de gouvemance estce que le secteur joue? Quelles sont les tendances spécifiques qui caractérisent ce secteur à I'heure actuelle? L'analyse porte sur un vaste ensemble de structures et de rôles, plutôt que sur un inventaire détaillé de programmes. Trois groupes d'activités gouvernementales sont étudiés:la planification, la consultation et la coordination de politiques; la création de structures, l'affectation de ressources et la prestation de services; et les rôles et processus de la responsabilisation. Chacun de ces groupes est examiné par rapport aux organismes du secteur public dépendant du gouvemement et aux organismes relatifs à l'enfance et à la famille et aux questions d'invalidité. Les secteurs de l'éducation, des soins de santé et des services sociaux sont présentés pour identifier les tendances et questions importantes dans la gouvemance de la politique canadienne sur l'invalidité. Une précupation du régime de gouvernance du secteur public concemant les enfants handicapés et leurs familles est I'absence de mécanismes centraux de responsabilisation qui soient clairs, consistants et centralisés. Ce discours sur la réforme de l'invalidité a déjàété tenu. La lenteur frustrante de cette réforme est attribuable entre autres à des facteurs bureaucratiques et à de faibles mécanismes de reddition de comptes. Pour aller au‐dellà de ce déjà vu, I'auteur sumère l'adoption d'un régime de gouvemance plus inclusif et plus intégré pour le domaine des politiques en matière d'invalidité.     

To Give or Not to Give: Modeling Individuals' Contribution Decisions

Employing data from a recent national survey on campaign finance, we examine the contribution behavior of individual citizens in the 2000 election. By disaggregating types of contributions, our model enables us to observe potential heterogeneity in the determinants of giving money to parties and candidates. We find that for both types of contributions, the effects of informational resources and solicitation on the decision to contribute outweigh those of financial resources. In addition, we propose both a theoretical and an empirical distinction between the selection effects of solicitation and the stimulus effects of solicitation. By distinguishing between these dual dimensions of solicitation, our analysis provides new insight into the causal linkages between income, solicitation, and contributions. We find that while solicitation increases the likelihood of contributing through selective targeting or rational prospecting, it also does so through a stimulus mechanism.