THE GHANAIAN ELECTIONS OF 1996: TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY?

Foreign donors expended over $23 million on micro-managing theDecember 1996 Ghanaian elections in an attempt to ensure thatthe process was technically ‘free and fair’. Owingpartly to this expenditure and partly to the efficiency andimpartiality of the Electoral Commission, the conduct of theelections was in fact remarkably technically correct. The losingopposition parties still complained, however, that PresidentRawlings and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC),exploited the advantages of incumbency to a degree that renderedthe result ‘free but not really fair’. The articleargues that such very limited acceptance of election results,however justified or unjustified, is almost bound to obtainin economically underdeveloped African societies where, partlyfor structural and partly for cultural reason, politics continuesto be very much a zero-sum game characterized by high levelsof distrust. This in turn suggests limits to the likely consolidationof multi-party democracy. The article also analyses the reasonsfor the electoral victory of Rawlings and the NDC, arguing thatit hinged on the rural population's trust in Rawlings' abilityto provide rural development and political stability.     

Consensus or dissensus about welfare in post-communist societies?

Abstract. The so-called 'third wave' of right-wing extremism has taken both society and social science by storm. In contrast to the many studies that look for possible explanations for the success of this 'wave', this article focusses on right-wing extremism itself. In the first part, the concept is defined on the basis of the existing literature, as a political ideology that consists of a combination of several features. In the second part, these features are first conceptualized and second used in a comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (the Dutch CP'86, the German NPD and the Austrian NDP). This analysis shows a more differentiated picture of the ideology of this 'party family', and is a warning against too careless generalisations.     

Political constitutionalism and populism

Criticisms of political constitutionalism's relationship to populism point in two opposed directions. Legal constitutionalists consider it too open to, and even as legitimating, populist politics, whereas radical democrats consider it too closed to popular participation, prompting an anti-system politics of a populist character. I dispute both these views. Underlying these contrasting assessments are differing conceptions of populism and constitutionalism. This article distinguishes right- from left-wing populism, and limited government from non-arbitrary rule, as constitutional ideals. Legal constitutionalism typically embraces the first ideal. However, that can be a driver of both right- and left-wing populism, and allow types of arbitrary rule that democratic backsliding and illiberal regimes can (and do) exploit. By contrast, political constitutionalism involves the second ideal and is antithetical to right-wing populism while potentially friendly to the legitimate demands of left-wing populism. Nevertheless, the practical reality of political constitutionalism in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) often falls short of its ideal theoretical potential. Addressing these shortcomings, however, requires strengthening democracy rather than the legal constitution, not least through electoral reform.     

STUDYING CRIME TRENDS: NORMAL SCIENCE AND EXOGENOUS SHOCKS*

The study of crime trends has proceeded along two paths: 1) normal science investigations of slow‐moving and tractable changes in crime rates and explanatory conditions and 2) research encounters with unexpected and abrupt changes in crime rates resulting from exogenous shocks. I draw from my research on the relationship between crime rates and changing macroeconomic conditions to illustrate the pains and pleasures of studying crime trends with the tools of normal science. I describe my exploratory investigations of the recent homicide rise in the United States to underscore the theoretical importance and methodological challenges of research on exogenous shocks to crime rates. Finally, I hope to convey to the next generation of criminologists the intellectual excitement that comes from the study of crime trends.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

Subnational Taxes in Developing Countries: The Way Forward

Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.