CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.     

Juvenile Accountability and the Specific Deterrent Effects of Short‐Term Confinement

To assess the specific deterrent (“teaching a lesson”) and normative validation effects of confinement, the intake histories of a random sample of youths (n=87) confined in a local detention facility were analyzed to determine if the amount of the immediately previous confinement or the total amount of confinement experienced affects the amount of time until the next system intake. No statistically significant relationships were found for any of the intakes, up through eight intakes. The findings, however, demonstrate that a non‐graduated approach to imposition of punishment that did not adequately emphasize individual accountability was not an effective deterrent for the more recalcitrant youths included in this study. Theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed.