Benefit estimation goes to court: The case of natural resource damage assessments

This article evaluates the feasibility of performing natural resource damage assessments under the current Superfund legislation. Using the analyses developed for two recent cases, it explains the sources of the substantial divergences between plaintiffs' and defendants' estimates of these damages. Three factors explain the differences in damage estimates: (1) the time horizon used and treatment of capitalization effects of past damages; (2) the extent of the market assumed in estimating the effects of a release of hazardous wastes on the demand for the affected natural resource; and (3) the character and availability of substitutes for the resource involved.     

Promoting small business through public-sector technology transfer

It is generally concluded that small businesses are the most effective institutional mechanism for the execution of technological innovation in the United States. Federal legislation provides for special considerations to be rendered to small businesses when public-sector technology is to be transferred to the private sector. Nevertheless, the activities of many federal laboratories lag in the transfer of technology to small businesses relative to large businesses. This paper examines the reasons for the current low level of interaction between federal laboratories and small businesses including the constraints typically encountered in working with small businesses. Recommendations are made to enhance the lab/small-business relationship. Finally, a sample program at Sandia National Laboratory for assistance to small businesses is described.     

Which Public Goods are Endangered?: How Evolving Communication Technologies Affect The Logic of Collective Action

Public Choice - The theory in Mancur Olson's The Logicof Collective Action is built fromhistorically uncontroversial assumptionsabout interpersonal communication. Today,evolving technologies...     

Coercive versus cooperative policies: Comparing intergovernmental mandate performance

Cooperative policies hold out promise of an improvement over coercive mandates as ways to enhance implementation of intergovernmental programs. By treating subordinate governments as regulatory trustees and emphasizing substantive compliance, the cooperative mandates avoid the onerous aspects of heavy-handed regulatory federalism. Our comparison of state hazard-mitigation policy in Florida and in New South Wales, Australia addresses procedural and substantive compliance under the two forms of intergovernmental policies. When local governments are not committed to state policy objectives, the coercive policy produces better results as evidenced by higher rates of procedural compliance and greater effort by local governments to achieve policy objectives. When local government commitment exists, the cooperative policy produces substantive results that are at least the equivalent to the coercive policy. Moreover, over the long run cooperative policies may have greater promise in sustaining local government commitment. The dilemma is to figure out how to motivate lagging jurisdictions that seem to require a coercive policy, while not straightjacketing leading jurisdictions that are capable of thriving under a cooperative regime.     

Three Duties to Rescue: Moral,Civil, and Criminal

Law and Philosophy -     

Access and allocation: the role of large shareholders and investors in leaving fossil fuels underground

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - An under-researched story is how large shareholders (e.g. Pension Funds) and investors (e.g. Export Credit Agencies) whose...     

Japan's Choices in a Changed Security Environment

China's rise and clear ambition to change Asia poses both tactical and strategic questions, long neglected in Japan. Tactically, territorial challenges can be countered effectively by use of Anti-Access Area Denial [A2/AD] tactics, as Japan is now doing. The strategic issues: how to deal with a hostile nuclear super-power neighbor, counter nuclear blackmail, and so forth, are far more difficult. This author believes that US “extended deterrence” no longer exists. Washington in fact would never use nuclear weapons to defend Japan, whatever promises have been made. The only answer, and one that decreases rather than increases the possibility of conflict, is for Japan to acquire within a decade a minimal nuclear deterrent, too small for war-making but adequate to prevent attack, such as those maintained by Britain and France, who know America best. Without such a deterrent Japan will be defenseless against inevitable Chinese nuclear threats and blackmail.