The evidential value of peptidase A as a semen typing system

Human erythrocyte peptidase A (Pep A) displays a genetic polymorphism in blacks. Its occurrence in human semen was examined for its possible use as a semen typing system. Studies by starch gel electrophoresis, in which the Pep A was located by an improved method, were carried out on semen, semen stains, and vaginal swabs taken at known times after intercourse. In addition, a large number of vaginal swabs, negative for semen, were taken from females throughout their menstrual cycles and examined for Pep A activity. The results indicated that Pep A typing could be carried out on semen and semen stains. However, it was possible to determine the Pep A type on vaginal swabs only when they had been taken within about 3 h after intercourse.     

Structure and Process in Consociationalism and Federalism

It is relatively easy to characterize the institutional structureof a country as consociational or federal. The task is muchmore difficult if we turn from structure to the decision process.Within a given structure, there may be a great deal of variationwith regard to the decision process. Data for such variationare given for the decision process in Switzerland for whichthe following four types are distinguished: (1) consociationaland federal, (2) consociational and unitary, (3) competitiveand federal, and (4) competitive and unitary. Difficulties arediscussed in aggregating from such a variation to a measurefor the prevailing decision process in a country as a whole.It is suggested that the problem be disaggregated and that decisionprocesses be compared for particular issues. This can be doneboth across and within countries.     

Information flow and party influence: Theory,measurement, and policy consequences

In this paper I present a theory of party influence, based on Bayesian decision theory, as a process in which the voting decisions of individual legislators are influenced by information concerning the votes or intended votes of their rank-and-file colleagues. Procedures derived from the theory are then used to estimate the magnitude of party influence relative to the influence of the president and of party leaders, committee cue givers, and constituents on roll call voting in three policy domains in the U.S. House of Representatives. The results imply that party influence has important short-run and long-run consequences for public policy.