First Priorities in Military Professionalism

This article contends that it is time for the armed forces to revisit their schools, day rooms, wardrooms, squadron meeting places, headquarters, bases and posts to increase the level of awareness and the teaching of professional norms.     

The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary on Ehud Sprinzak's The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right∗

Between 1968 and 1974 Italy was subjected to an unusually virulent campaign of right‐wing terrorism and subversion. An illustrative episode associated with this so‐called ‘strategy of tension’, which was characterized by the systematic use of covert ‘false flag’ operations, was the 17 May 1973 grenade attack outside Milan police headquarters that resulted in four dead and over 40 injured. Although the perpetrator, Gianfranco Bertoli, claimed to be an ‘individualist anarchist’ and had in fact established contacts with certain anarchist and leftist groups, subsequent judicial investigations revealed that he had been an informant and infiltrator for the Italian military intelligence service, that he had long maintained links with various anti‐communist and neo‐fascist organizations, and that he apparently received ‘cover’ and some type of logistical support prior to the attack from one or more ‘international secret services’. Although many aspects of the crime still remain murky, in all probability Bertoli was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of clandestine, quasi‐official intelligence apparatuses rather than a solitary anarchist engaging in violent ‘propaganda of the deed’.     

The rise of China—challenges and opportunities for the European Union

Asia Europe Journal - China’s growing power and influence raise important and inescapable questions for countries and societies around the world, not least for Europe. A rising China offers...     

The coalition of the willing: Effect of country diversity in an environmental treaty game

It is analyzed how size differences among countries affect the benefits from climate coalitions. It is shown that size differences lead to smaller coalitions and greater benefits than coalitions among identical countries. The importance of trigger strategies for supporting cooperative solutions is considered. A real world example, based on the world’s six largest emitters, is used to illustrate the implications of size differences in terms of emissions versus valuations of benefits. Climate coalitions become smaller when ranking in terms of benefits is different from ranking in terms of emissions. Three cases of benefit valuations are considered: benefits equal (i) share in world emissions, (ii) share in world GDP, and (iii) share of world population.