Problems of co-ordination in upazila administration in Bangladesh

The present government of Bangladesh has extensively reformed the administrative system and upgraded the previous thana to upazila (sub-district) to serve as the focal point of development administration. A new tier of local government called Upazila Parishad (UZP) has been created and a large number of functions have been devolved to this institution along with the placement of central government employees at its disposal. The reformers argue that the present system will remove the inadequacies of the previous administrative system and will bring about an improvement in the co-ordination of field services at the upazila level. However, the actual situation represents a totally different picture. The desired integration— both vertical and horizontal—and co-ordination in local level planning is non-existent due to the absence of any clear direction from the central government. Proper co-ordination among the field services in the upazila administration does not exist due to the anomalous relation between the upazila and the national government, including excessive central control; the involvement of multiple agencies of the central government in guiding and supervising; ambiguity in government thinking; the absence of clarification from the ministries concerned and agencies on the timing of different development programmes; and conflict over the allocation of resources. There is also conflict between the different tiers of local government in respect of authority and resources. Relations between public representatives and officials at the upazila level are strained because a clear allocation of authority to political executives is lacking; areas for co-operation among different agencies have not been clarified; and public representatives and government officials lack mutual respect.     

Decentralizing water supply services in developing countries: Factors affecting the success of community management

This article examines the problem of extending access to potable water through conventionally controlled government services and describes the roles of non-governmental organizations and community management associations in improving service delivery and maintaining local water systems. Six sets of factors that are crucial to the success of community management are identified: adequate incentives, sufficient skills and resources, appropriate processes for water systems operations and maintenance, effective interorganizational relationships, appropriate technology, and effective systems of monitoring, evaluation and feedback. The components that must be taken into consideration in designing and implementing programmes for decentralizing water supply systems through community management are set out.     

Local economic development practices in Ontario

It is clear that urban economic development practices in Ontario tend to cluster in certain classifications. The most widely and consistently used practices are in the area of marketing. On average, nine out of eleven techniques are practised by the cities surveyed. Governance tools and infrastructure investments are also fairly widely employed, with an average of six out of ten uniformly used. Governmental regulations, land and property management activities, and financial tools are less widely employed, with averages of five of thirteen, four of eleven, and two of twelve techniques practised by all cities respectively. In total, cities in Ontario employ an average of twenty-five out of fifty-seven economic development techniques listed. The ten most widely practised techniques across all categories are identified in Table 6. Again, marketing activities figure predominantly. However, landbased incentives and initiatives such as land acquisition, industrial zoning and industrial parks, and infrastructure improvements also are important. Based on these findings, it appears that cities in Ontario offer a range of economic development incentives which conforms closely to those widely practised by other cities. Marketing, site acquisition, and infrastructure improvement are among the most commonly used techniques according to literature. Indeed, because much of the literature focuses on cities in the United States, this research also suggests that similar economic development incentives are offered by cities in Canada and the United States. However, financial incentives such as tax abatements, loans, and loan guarantees are notable by their absence in Ontario cities. Does the limitation on bonuses affect economic development practices in the other categories? In other words, what appears to be the result of provincial restrictions on bonuses? Based on survey results and personal interviews with a small sample of economic development officials in Ontario, it does seem that restrictions have had some impact. While common techniques do centre in the marketing and land based areas, it appears that Ontario cities are also more likely to use more innovative means of attracting economic development. For example, business incubators and training programs are utilized by over 25 per cent of the cities. Thus these techniques, often promoted in the literature as more advantageous to cities, seem to be used more widely in Ontario than in many other cities. Regulations to limit or control certain facets of development also seem more prevalent than easing governmental regulations to promote development. Finally, some innovative techniques such as awards for research and development are also evident. While many economic development officials acknowledge that provincial restrictions limit their ability to compete with other cities, particularly those in the United States (52 per cent agree), they are split over whether such restrictions are too extreme (40 per cent feel they are too restricted, 43 per cent feel that they are not). In interviews it was often suggested that such limitations do reduce the inter-city competition for development which often drives economic development policies in cities that are allowed to offer tax abatements and other incentives. Further research is warranted to explore more fully the effect of restrictions on economic development bonuses. If such limitations regularly result in practices that are judged to be effective in promoting economic development, then such policies as those contained in the Municipal Act appear promising.     

The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: Isometric Budgeting

The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article.     

Tax Expenditure Reporting: The Utilization of an Innovation

Central to this article is the question, “Are tax expenditure reports used?” State legislators serving on tax committees in ten states were surveyed regarding their use and their perceptions of others' use of tax expenditure report information. Responses indicate (1) strong acceptance and broad use of report information; (2) purposes and policy stages of use characteristic of technical information use; and (3) use focused predominantly on resource acquisition (revenue) policy rather than resource allocation (budget) policy. Thus it appears that tax expenditure reporting does not operate to secure budgetary control over tax expenditures, and consequently tax expenditures continue largely to escape budget scrutiny.     

The Failure of Success in Natural Resource Policy: Pacific Salmon Harvest Policy in New York State

Natural resource management policies like the Pacific salmon harvest policy developed by New York State often did not anticipate the extent of social, economic, and ethical concerns that would be generated, largely because the agency concentrated on biological considerations. The number of concerned stakeholders grew in proportion to both the success and failure of the initial policy. Had all participants been equally willing to recognize both the successes and the failures, development of a revised policy through group negotiations may have been possible, resulting in a cooperative mode of decision making. Instead, institutional mechanisms based on legislated process were ultimately the approach chosen for policy revision.