Bureaucratic politics and the new fighter aircraft decisions

Abstract. According to the bureaucratic politics approach to policy making, an appreciation of competition and conflict among bureaucrats is considered to be critical for an understanding of decision outcomes. In this paper, we employ the bureaucratic politics model to assess the outcomes of the initial phase of the Canadian government's new fighter aircraft (NFA) program, which began in March 1977 with cabinet approval of the procurement and ended in April 1980 when cabinet announced the selection of the McDonnell Douglas F-18A Hornet. This paper examines the interests of the three departments responsible for furnishing cabinet with recommendations - National Defence, Supply and Services, and Industry, Trade and Commerce. We examine instances of conflict among the bureaus involved, but conclude that, overall, conflict was relatively muted in this case. Three reasons are offered to explain why conflict between departments was not endemic to the NFA program, and several broader conclusions are drawn about the applicability and utility of the bureaucratic politics approach. Sommaire. D'après l'approche de politique bureaucratique en matière d'élaboration de politiques, l'on considère qu'il est très important d'évaluer les rivalités et les conflits existants entre les bureaucrates pour comprendre les conséquences d'une décision. Dans le présent article, les auteilrs se servent du modèle de politique bureaucratique pour évaluer les conséquences de la phase initiale du programme fédéral Nouvel avion de chasse (NAC). Cette phase a débuté en mars 1977 lorsque le conseil des ministres a approuvé l'acquisition d'un tel avion et s'est teminée en avril 1980 avec la sélection du F-18A Hornet de McDonnell Douglas. Cet article examine les intérêts des trois ministères chargés de présenter leurs recommandations au cabinet, à savoir: la Défense nationale, Approvisionnements et Services, et Industrie et Commerce. Il étudie les cas de conflits entre les services concernés mais conclue que dans l'ensemble, dans le cas en question, les conflits étaient pratiquement inexistants. Les auteurs donnent trois raisons expliquant pourquoi il n'y a pas eu de conflits endé miques entre les ministères à propos de ce programme NAC et ils tirent plusieurs conclusions plus générales au sujet de I'applicabilité et de l'utilité de l'approche de poli tique bureaucratique.     

The Ministry of State for Science and Technology

Abstract. During the past two and a half years, the federal government has employed a new and experimental mechanism to formulate and co-ordinate its science policies, the Ministry of State for Science and Technology, a horizontal planning and co-ordinating agency headed by a minister of state. The portfolio's mandate includes neither the statutory authority to regulate other departments and agencies of the federal government nor the opportunity to implement programs in the fields of science and technology. The structure of this ministry and its role vis-à-vis other federal government departments and agencies, other levels of government, and the scientific-technological community are described and evaluated in this essay. The essay examines, first, the constraints inherent in the nature of this new mechanism, given the existing organization of the executive-bureaucratic arena and, second, the consequent problems which have been experienced in the attempts of this ministry to formulate and wordinate science policies for the federal government. The analysis of the ministry's role is based primarily on confidential interviews with government officials and secondarily on reports and studies of Canada's science policy machinery. The analysis concludes with an assessment of the future roles of the ministry and recommends a significant reorientation of the ministry's efforts in light of the existing allocation of responsibility for policy and programs and the requirements of the science policy field. Sommaire. Au cours des trente derniers mois, le gouvernement fédéral s'est servi d'un nouvel outil expérimental pour élaborer et coordonner ses politiques scienti-fiques:le ministère d'État, aux Sciences et à la Technologie, qui exerce une fonction de planification et de concertation sectorielles. Le mandat de cet organisme n'englobe pas la réglementation de l'activité d'autres ministères et offices de l'État, ni la mise en ?uvre de programmes scientifiques ou techniques. Les auteurs décrivent et évaluent la structure du ministère d'État et son rôle à l'égard des autres ministères et offices de l'État, des autres paliers d'administration et des communautés scientifique et technique. Ils examinent tout d'abord les contraintes découlant de la nature même du ministère d'État au sein de la superstructure administrative et bureaucratique, et les problèmes qui en ont résulté pour le ministère au cours de ses travaux d'élaboration et de coordination des politiques scientifiques fédérales. Les auteurs basent leur analyse du rôle du ministère d'État, principalement sur des entretiens confidentiels avec des hauts fonctionnaires, et accessoirement sur des rapports et des études à propos des mécanismes canadiens d'élaboration des politiques scientifiques. Ils tenninent leur analyse par une prospective du rôle du ministère d'État, et ils recomman-dent un réaménagement de ses activités en fonction de la répartition actuelle des responsabilités en matière d'élaboration de politiques et de mise en ?uvre de programmes, et à la lumière des nécessités de la politique des sciences.     

Intellectualizing about the moon-ghetto metaphor: A study of the current malaise of rational analysis of social problems

The title refers to the widely held view that advanced western societies (particularly the United States) have been vastly more successful in meeting certain kinds of objectives, than others, and that rectifying this imbalance is a high priority social objective. The paper is concerned with three intellectual traditions that have purported to explain the reasons for the problem, and to provide guidance for helping with the lot of the ghetto. One of these traditions views the problems in terms of inadequate policy machinery, and the resolution in terms of better analysis feeding into the policymaking process. A second views the problem in terms of organizational structure, and searches for a solution in terms of institutional reform or redesign. Still a third tradition sees the problem as stemming from the past allocation of scientific and technical talent, and proposes a solution in terms of a significant reallocation of research and development activity. It is apparent that these traditions of analysis, neither separately nor together, have been very successful in resolving social problems. The purpose of the essay is, through examination of the intellectual traditions and their interaction with the policymaking process, to try to illuminate the nature of their weaknesses and, if possible, to see what lessons can be learned regarding how to make analysis more useful, and map out some potentially fruitful directions for intellectual exploration.The author is indebted to Graham Allison, Harvey Brooks, John Patrick Crecine, Lee Friedman, A. O. Hirschman, C. E. Lindblom, Keith Pavitt, Kenneth Warner, and Douglas Yates for helpful criticism and encouragement. The debt I owe to these intellectual colleagues goes far beyond their reactions to this paper. Many of my better ideas have been lifted from them. I could list here a number of other important influences but in a paper of this sort the author is faced with a Hobson's choice regarding footnote acknowledgements. On the one hand he could footnote all of the obvious sources and influences on particular points, in which case the footnotes would take up more space than the text. Or he can be parsimonious and be accused of stealing, without acknowledgement, other people's ideas. With apologies, and misgivings, I have opted for the second strategy both in this opening footnote and throughout the paper.     

WTO 2.0: Governance of 21st century trade

The cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, know-how and people associated with international production networks–call it ‘supply-chain trade’ for short–has transformed the world. The WTO has not kept pace. This paper argues that adapting world trade governance to the realities of supply-chain trade will require a new organization–a WTO 2.0 as it were. Reasoning on the optimal nature of the new organization is based on the nature of supply-chain trade, the nature of the disciplines that underpin it, and the nature of the gains from cooperation.     

Calavita's Invitation to Law & Society: Introduction to the Symposium

This essay introduces a Law & Social Inquiry symposium on Kitty Calavita's book Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010) that features comments on the law and society enterprise by Jeannine Bell, Austin Sarat, and Christopher Tomlins. It briefly discusses the commentators' views of this enterprise as revealed in their essays and challenges points made by each of them. It goes on to discuss the book's suitability as a student‐oriented introduction to the field of law and society, filling a gap the commentators left open.     

Underdevelopment,Urban Squatting,and The State Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Tanzania

This article investigates a part of the “story of the story” of the 1924 revolution, the first popular anticolonial uprising in Sudan to be framed by a nationalist ideology. Considering that the process that turns a past event into history is neither linear nor predictable, I draw on Trouillot's “catalogue of silences” to compare two sets of sources that correspond to two moments in the making of 1924 as history: first, the judicial records produced by the Sudan government during 1924, and second the Ewart Report, written in 1925, to “seal” the revolution. A comparison of these two sources reveals radical discrepancies in the narrative, as well as the silences imposed on and well-concealed fine-tunings of the various voices of the revolution. Of these two sets of sources, it is the Ewart Report that provides the most influential interpretation of the 1924 revolution.