Clarifying the Contours of the Police Legitimacy Measurement Debate: a Response to Cao and Graham

Asian Journal of Criminology - With the emergence of police legitimacy as a major indicator of good policing, scholars have continued to push our conceptual understanding of this construct. In...     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Karman</Emphasis>-Theory in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> Prolegomena to an Inquiry into the Culture and the Condition of Philosophical Reflection About Human Life and the Requirements of Liberation

After delimiting the topic by reflecting on the heuristic function of the concept of “theory” in “Delimiting the Topic” section, the paper considers the literary aspects of karman-theory in the Mahābhārata in “Literary Characteristics” section (treating questions, characters, episodes, tracts, metaphors, and intertextuality). “Axioms, Theorems, Domains” section then lists the elements or axioms that fall under the umbrella term “karman-theory.” Next, dealing with contexts and collocations, “Contexts, Collocations” section combines the consideration of literary and theoretical aspects of the matter. “Historical Perspective” section then argues for the inclusion of a historical perspective in the study of karman-theory. The “Conclusion”, section, formulates provisional results and poses further questions.     

Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of ?rīhar?a can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in ?rīhar?a’s masterpiece, the Kha??anakha??a-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramā?a) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting ?rīhar?a’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that ?rīhar?a is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing ?rīhar?a’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of ?rīhar?a’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.     

The Identity of Person and World in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Caraka Saṃhitā</Emphasis> 4.5

This paper examines the puru?a concept in the Caraka Sa?hitā (CS), an early text of Ayurveda, and its relation to Indic thinking about phenomenal worldhood. It argues that, contrary to the usual interpretation, early Ayurveda does not consider the person to be a microcosmic replication of the macrocosmos. Instead, early Ayurveda asserts that personhood is worldhood, and thus the person is non-different from the phenomenal totality (spatial and temporal) of his existence. This is confirmed by the CS’s several definitions of puru?a, which are alternately posed in terms familiar to Vai?e?ika, early (pre-“classical”) Sā?khya, early Buddhism, and Upani?adic monism. It is likewise confirmed by the Ayurvedic logic of sāmānya (translated as “identity”), which governs the meaning of the list of person-to-world correspondences in CS 4.5 and its often misinterpreted claim, puru?o’yam lokasa?mita?. Finally it is confirmed in the program of Ayurvedic therapeutics, which aims at establishing various kinds of “appropriateness” for the sake of effecting samayoga—the “harmonious joining” of person and world.     

Natural Liberation in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sāṃkhyakārikā</Emphasis> and Its Commentaries

The subject of this article is the concept of natural liberation in classical Sā?khya. On the basis of the Sā?khyakārikā by ī?varak???a and its traditional commentaries, I will attempt to demonstrate that liberation from suffering in Sā?khya is not the result of rational inquiry—the prevailing view among contemporary scholars. The Sā?khya does not necessarily prescribe yogic practice as argued by other scholars. Instead, I will defend a position expressed by K.C. Bhattacharyya and Frank R. Podgorski, according to which liberation in classical Sā?khya is a natural and spontaneous process of suffering transforming into its own cure. I will argue that although traditional authorities may disagree over the form the liberating process takes on the phenomenal level (as yogic practice, instruction from a teacher, etc.), there is a general agreement that the natural forces are the primary drives and agents of liberation.     

(Close) the Door,the King (is Going): The Development of Elliptical Resolution in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā

This paper examines three commentaries on the ?abdapariccheda in Kumārila Bha??a’s ?lokavārttika, along with the the seventeenth century Bhā??a Mīmā?sā work, the Mānameyodaya. The focus is the Mīmā?sā principle that only sentences communicate qualified meanings and Kumārila’s discussion of a potential counter-example to this claim–single words which appear to communicate such content. I argue that there is some conflict among commentators over precisely what Kumārila describes with the phrase sāmarthyād anumeyetvād, although he is most likely describing ellipsis completion through arthāpatti. The paper attempts both a cogent exegesis and philosophical evaluation of the Bhā??a Mīmā?sā view of ellipsis completion, arguing that there remain internal tensions in the account of ellipsis preferred by the Bhā??a, tensions which are not entirely resolved even by the late date of the Mānameyodaya.     

How Can the Word “Cow” Exclude Non-cows? Description of Meaning in Dignāga’s Theory of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Apoha</Emphasis>

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenaga?i. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.