The business of a secret war: Operation ‘Remorse’ and SOE salesmanship in Wartime China

The prime British objective in China during the Pacific War was the re-establishment of pre-war trade and influence and the recovery of Hong Kong. Through Operation ‘Remorse’ (1944–45) the Special Operations Executive covertly established a wide network of distributors and buyers throughout occupied and unoccupied China for high-value low-bulk goods and currencies, using the returns acccruing to buy influence, information, safety and food for Allied prisoners, subsidise politically problematic operations, and smooth the British path back into Hong Kong. ‘Remorse’ epitomised the concerns and demonstrated the methods of the British presence in China generally: a readiness to innovate and adapt, market sensitivity and a capacity for making unlikely local alliances, all held together through a strong focus on a fixed target – a secure China base for Sino-British trade.     

On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions

In the winter 1978 issue of International Security, Raymond L. Garthoff authored a seminal article outlining common fallacies in United States government estimates of enemy intentions during the Cold War. Now, given the significant changes in threat over the past 30 years, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look at fallacies – evaluating old ones and introducing new ones – in enemy intentions estimates pertaining to post-Cold War (and post-9/11) security dangers. Based on its assessment, this article concludes that the challenges to accurate intelligence assessment of enemy intentions, and the need to move away from dysfunctional standard operating procedures, have never been higher.