Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions

Public Choice - This paper poses a deceptively simple question. It asks, how can a program or group of programs that provides distributive benefits to recipients in a minority of legislative...     

Self-imposed term limits

In “Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits,” Dick and Lott argue that since more senior representatives are better at rent-seeking, there is an inefficient tendency to re-elect incumbents. In their model, term limits are preferred collectively by constituencies, even though no constituency would independently oust its incumbent representative. However, many term limits are unilaterally self-imposed (in particular the 22nd amendment limiting presidents' terms to two), and their model cannot explain these limits. In this comment, I suggest that term limits may be self-imposed by risk-averse voters, who prefer cycling between left and right wing candidates to a once-and-for-all election that imposes a candidate of a single ideology on the entre electorate. The market failure that makes term limits helpful is that out of power minorities cannot bribe the median voter.     

Budget Control in Virginia Public School Districts

This article examines the selection and use of a budget approval technique. Specifically, two research questions are addressed: (1) Does the use of a particular budget approval method by a governmental body impact the execution of the budget? (2) What characteristics of a local government are associated with its decision to use a particular budget approval method? Both research questions are addressed by analyzing data from public school systems in the Commonwealth of Virginia, specifically, whether using categorical budget approval differs in the accuracy of budgeting versus using a lump-sum approval method. Characteristics of Virginia school districts are also analyzed according to whether any of them are likely to be associated with school districts using a particular approval method. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the next section describes the role of budgeting control in schools; subsequent sections review Virginia school district budgeting practices, develop the empirical model used to test the hypotheses, describe the sample, analyze the results of empirical tests and discuss implications of the findings.     

The Single Audit Act of 1984: A Survey of Practitioners

The Single Audit Act of 1984 (SAA) attempted to strengthen Congress's control over disbursement and monitoring of federal funds intended for governmental and nonprofit entities. The SAA's primary agent of federal control is the auditor. This article examines the historical development of the SAA and discusses the results of a survey of auditors and accountants who are members of the Intergovernmental Auditing Forum. The survey addresses auditors' conception of the SAA and the auditor's role in achieving better control of federal disbursements.     

Species loss revisited

Among his books are The Economics of Population Growth; Effort, Opportunity, and Wealth;and Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment, and Immigration (the latter was published by Transaction).     

State and federal tax equity: Estimates before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986

The progressivity and equity of both state and federal individual income taxes, as well as the combined system of both taxes, are examined before and after the federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 using a variety of measures applied to federal Statistics of Income individual income tax data; state taxes are calculated using TAXSIM. Our findings are as follows: First, in both 1985 and 1987, state personal income taxes were generally less progressive and more horizontally equitable than the federal system. Second, in moving from 1985 to 1987, state personal income tax systems generally displayed decreased progressivity and horizontal inequity. The combination of the two systems displayed generally lower progressivity and horizontal equity scores when we compare 1987 to 1985. Last, the after-tax income distribution became more unequal when we compared 1987 to 1985.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.