PREDICTING STATE ABORTION LEGISLATION FROM U.S. SENATE VOTES: THE EFFECTS OF APPARENT IDEOLOGICAL SHIRKING

The recent Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services giving more discretion to states to regulate abortion has led to speculation concerning which states might move to limit abortions. Medoff (1989) attempts to predict how state legislatures might vote on state-level abortion legislation by examining the 1983 Senate vote on the Hatch/Eagleton Amendment. We expand upon Medoff's analysis by incor- porating recent developments in agency theory as it applies to the political agents (i.e., Senators) in the empirical model. The results demonstrate that accounting for Senatorial "shirking" and state ideology substantially im- proves the predictive ability of the model for the Senate abortion vote. The predicted votes of the state's Senators, after eliminating the effects of apparent Senatorial shirking, are used to infer the likelihood of state-level legislation substantially restricting abortion. We compare these results to a base model that ignores the issue of shirking and find increased predict- ability and several differing results.     

The political economy of environmental regulation: Towards a unifying framework

There are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy. Building on insights from this theoretical work, and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance, this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation. There are two primary contributions of this research. The first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy. For example, there is, as yet, no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive-based mechanisms, such as marketable permits and effluent fees. The second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy. This framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Gordon Hester for helpful comments. Responsibility for the final product rests solely with the author.     

Two Cheers for Paperwork: The Value and Burden of Federal Reporting

In principle, reporting by state and local governments to thefederal government is essential to the design and implementationof national policy. In practice, reporting often engenders resentmentof federal intrusion and is often dismissed as a waste of stateand local resources. Is reporting useless? Does it strengthenthe federal government at the expense of state and local governments?We asked federal, state, local, and site officials about thevalue and burden of five specific reporting systems in elementaryand secondary education. Common assumptions about reportingdid not correspond to respondent reactions. Both value and burdencascade through the intergovernmental system, reaching policymakersin all governments. Although critics seldom discriminate betweentypes of reporting, we found that reporting designed to improvecompliance with federal standards evoked different judgmentsof value and burden than reporting designed for assistance.These results suggest some new approaches to federal policygoverning the collection of information and to the design ofindividual reporting systems.     

A REGIME FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS: COOPERATION AND RECONCILIATION OF FEDERALIST IMPERATIVES

The diffusion of authority characteristic of federal governance challenges national leadership and complicates even the implementation of policy that promises mutual gains. To explore the problems of implementing national policy in a federalist context, this paper proposes a new approach to analysis, t h e implementation regime framework. From the regime perspective, the essential task of the implementation process is to create a context in which implementors are likely to cooperate to achieve policy goals despite the absence of dominating authority. Drawing upon the literature on international cooperation, the regime framework outlines the contextual conditions and elements of policy design that are likely to lead to cooperation in collective decision making.     

Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians

This paper analyzes principal-agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters, challengers, and incumbents. The introduction of a last period (via finite-livedness) in combination with voters' imperfect information about politicians' preferences causes time-varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians. Political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences, potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments. In the extreme, sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office. A systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist, and depends on how quickly sorting takes place. We show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences. In addition, if sorting is a significant feature of political markets, cross-sectional studies will tend to oversample little- and non-shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies. Reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed.We wish to thank John Bond, Donald Deere, Gertrud Fremling, Tim Gronberg, Michael Munger, Russell Roberts, and the participants of workshops at Dartmouth College, Texas A&M University, University of Houston, University of Texas, Yale Law School, and the 1987 Public Choice Meetings for valuable discussions on earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was issued as working paper E-87-34 by the Hoover Institution. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Sentencing Commission nor those of any of its Commissioners. Any remaining errors are of course our own.     

Whose wants in ‘needs-based planning’? Some examples of unwritten agendas from the provincial integrated rural development programmes of Papua New Guinea

The rhetoric of ‘needs’-based planning requires little refining. What must be questioned and recognized are the values of decision makers and the unwritten agendas of those involved in the planning process. Taking the example of some of the integrated rural development programmes (IRDPs) in Papua New Guinea, this paper looks at the way planners and others cast development and information ‘nets’. These nets abrogate indigenous development processes. The ‘nets’ make it easy for development professionals and others involved in planning to follow unwritten agendas and difficult for target groups to articulate their ‘needs’ and to understand what is going on. It is suggested that these problems are not unique to PNG and may well be relevant to ‘needs based planning’ in other situations.     

Differentiating specialists and generalists within college students' social support networks

In order to examine the relationships among social network structure, types of social support, and determinants of support satisfaction, an alternative method was used to score the Social Support Questionnaire (SSQ). Factor analysis procedures suggested that college students' (N=198) social networks consisted of four groups: nuclear family, other family, friends, and others. Satisfaction with support was positively related to the proportion of the network occupied by nuclear family and negatively related to the proportion of friends in the network. Evidence was found for the presence of both support specialists and support generalists in the networks of the college students. These results are discussed from a developmental perspective with attention to the implications for interventions.