Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.     

Excepted substances: a comparison of Federal and state laws.

A state law has placed an obligation on the criminal investigation laboratories to screen and quantitate all preparations, both pharmaceutical and illicit, that fall under the provisions of "Excepted Substances." Without complete screens on these preparations, there is room for erroneous indictments as well as possible acquittals on technicalities.