Pyro-Terrorism—The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future Terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction

The United States is at significant risk of a future pyro-terrorist attack—when terrorists unleash the latent energy in the nation's forests to achieve the effect of a weapon of mass destruction—the threat, must be defined America's vulnerabilities understood, and action taken to mitigate this danger to the United States.     

Patterns in the lives of ETA members

Abstract

Based on 48 fairly detailed personal case histories, and more limited data on 447 other individuals, this article describes significant patterns in the lives of members of the Basque insurgent organization Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). The article discusses the age and sex of ETA members, the socioeconomic background of the members and their families, and their ethnic and linguistic characteristics. The article also describes life in ETA, the radicalization of Basque youth, how new members are recruited into the organization, how they live and what they do as members, how ETA members relate to family, friends and loved ones, and how they terminate their relationship to the organization. The study finds ETA members to be not the alienated and pathologically distressed individuals who join other insurgent organizations, but rather they are psychologically healthy persons for the most part, strongly supported by their families and their ethnic community.     

Ambassador David Bruce and “LBJ's War”: Vietnam Viewed from London, 1963–1968

Recent decades have seen growing historical interest in “second rank” officials who, whilst they do not play a leading role in government or political movements, can influence the way decisions are shaped and executed. At the same time, the interest of scholars in American policy during the Vietnam War shows no signs of abating. This article investigates the experience of one second rank official during the war, David Bruce, who was Ambassador to London during 1961–1969. Making particular use of Bruce's extensive diaries, it traces his shifting views on the war, looks at the extent to which he shared the outlook of other official,s and asks what influence, if any, he had on events. It argues that, whilst he always remained loyal to his own government and often mirrored the outlook of the Johnson Administration, Bruce had his own perspective on events, was consistently critical of American tactics on the ground, and, in Spring 1967, influenced by Robert McNamara, became an early advocate of retrenchment.     

SECRETARY OF STATE MARSHALL,GENERAL CLAY,AND THE MOSCOW COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING OF 1947: A RESPONSE TO PHILIP ZELIKOW

This commentary challenges the major conclusion of a 1997 article which appeared in this journal. There, Philip Zelikow argued that previous treatments of the Council of Foreign Ministers 1947 meeting in Moscow erred in their characterization of the role of US Secretary of State Marshall. Earlier studies, in Zelikow’s view, failed to understand that Marshall, refusing to be constrained by the recently announced containment policy, made a serious effort to meet Soviet demands for reparations from current German output. It is contended here that a review of the evidence, especially materials from the John Foster Dulles papers and from British archives, does not support Zelikow’s conclusion.