Corruption around the world: an analysis by partial least squares—structural equation modeling

Public Choice - This paper contributes to the empirical research on corruption in three ways. From a methodological viewpoint, it applies partial least squares–structural equation modeling to...     

Political competition and economic performance: evidence from the Italian regions

We verify the predictions of the theoretical literature on the relationship between political competition and economic performance, holding that, when the predominance of an ideological dimension creates a political rent, the party exploiting it selects lower quality politicians whose policy choices worsen economic performance. We examine the sample of 15 Italian Regions from 1980 to 2002 that exploits the institutional reforms of 1995 as an exogenous shock to pre-existing rents. We find evidence that higher political competition improves economic performance, through the choice of more efficiency-oriented policies.     

Public Service Motivation and Job Sector Choice: Evidence from a Developing Country

This article explores the determinants of actual job sector decisions of highly skilled professionals across four different sectors in a developing country, with a particular interest in the relationship with public service motivation (PSM). Unlike most previous cross-sectional studies, it uses a pooled time series of individual antecedents and job characteristics, both before and after the individuals leave the job market to pursue graduate education abroad. The results indicate that there are key differences in terms of the determinants of job sector choices across the four sectors, and that PSM appears to have a differential role on the attraction of individuals to each of those sectors.     

Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union

Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well‐known political machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of parties supported by the SNTE machine is higher in polling stations located in schools. This effect is absent when teachers are asked to mobilize voters in support of a party for which they have no partisan attachment, and it is uncorrelated with the union's monitoring capacity. This suggests that partisan attachment, rather than incentives and monitoring, explains the SNTE's effectiveness as a political machine.     

The new generation of international investment agreements: recent developments in the Asia–Pacific region

Over the past decade, a number of countries in the Asia Pacific region have concluded a new generation of FTAs that liberalise trade in goods and services while also containing investment protection provisions. This paper provides an overview of the recent trends giving special attention to the impact of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) cases which has influenced the evolution of investment rule-making over the last decade. The paper asserts that investment disputes have influenced the refinement of the provisions of the new generation of investment agreements as well as the inclusion of a series of procedural and substantive innovations in these agreements. *Ambassador of Costa Rica to the European Union, Belgium and Luxembourg. This paper was written on the basis of several research projects in which the author participated, before assuming the current position with the Costa Rican government, as consultant with UNCTAD. However, the opinions and views expressed in this paper do not represent the position of UNCTAD, nor the Government of Costa Rica and fully fall under responsibility of the author.

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Indicators of electoral victory

We explore the role that campaign expenditures play in determining electoral outcomes. We study a two-party contest where campaign funds can affect the preferences of voters regarding the saliency of two political issues. We show that an advantage in campaign resources, a pre-campaign partisan advantage, an advantage on every salient issue, or a combination of these indicators, do not always guarantee electoral victory. By contrast, electoral victory is guaranteed if the sum of the proportions of the electorate supporting a party on every salient issue is greater than a critical value. For that to happen it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the party has an advantage on every salient issue.     

Patronage Politics and Contentious Collective Action: A Recursive Relationship

Based on ethnographic reanalysis and on current qualitative research on poor people's politics, this article argues that routine patronage politics and nonroutine collective action should be examined not as opposite and conflicting political phenomena but as dynamic processes that often establish recursive relationships. Through a series of case studies conducted in contemporary Argentina, this article examines four instances in which patronage and collective action intersect and interact: network breakdown, patron's certification, clandestine support, and reaction to threat. These four scenarios demonstrate that more than two opposing spheres of action or two different forms of sociability, patronage, and contentious politics can be mutually imbricated. Either when it malfunctions or when it thrives, clientelism may lie at the root of collective action.     

Privatization in Argentina: The implications for corruption

The article analyzes the privatization program carried out under the Carlos Menem administration in Argentina between 1989 and 1995. It shows how, on many occasions, the divestiture of government-owned assets was often carried out within a very weak legal framework which, in turn, opened windows of opportunities for corrupt behavior and collusive practices involving high ranking government officials and private corporations. Based on their findings, the authors stress the crucial role that transparency plays for effective results to take place after government selloffs. Indeed, the Argentine case shows that there is a strong correlation between the legal and regulatory problems that often arise in the aftermath of state divestitures and privatizations that have been carried out hastily and under a cloud of corruption allegations.     

Price-wage dynamics in a transition economy: The case of Poland

In this paper we analyse the wage-price relationship of an economy in transition characterized by important structural changes. It is known (see Perron, 1989) that structural breaks in stationary time series can induce apparent unit roots. The stationarity analysis of the series employed in the present model is conducted jointly with the assumption that the breakpoint location is unknown. We follow a testing procedure recently proposed by Zivot and Andrews (1992). Cointegration analysis of wages and prices in the presence of structural breaks finds empirical evidence in favour of two cointegrating vectors involving prices and wages. Our analysis focuses on the different structural behaviour of the price-wage dynamic relationship in the short and long term; we also demonstrate the relative importance of import prices as a source of wage-price fluctuations.     

Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence

This paper examines inference and attribution in a simple and ubiquitous strategic situation: a voter is faced with discerning whether a leader worked on his or her behalf after observing an informative, but noisy signal about the leader's performance. We characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria, quantal response equilibria (QRE), and provide a simple model of a heuristic-based approach, referred to as strategic naivete, within a wide class of such environments. We also discuss experiments conducted to examine human behavior within such an environment. While it is clear that the observed behavior is inconsistent with perfect Bayesian equilibrium, distinguishing between QRE and strategic naivete will require further work. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of probabilistic and/or heuristic-based attribution processes for electoral politics and political economy.