Impact of hypnotic testimony on the jury

In the past decade, the forensic use of hypnosis to enhance the memories of victims, witnesses, and defendants has sharply increased. A great deal of controversy surrounds this issue. Some commentators argue that testimony derived from hypnosis should not be allowed as evidence because of its inherent unreliability and the unduly powerful impact it may have on a jury. In the present research, we used a jury simulation technique to study the impact that a hypnotically refreshed witness has upon jurors' decision making. A major finding is that jurors view hypnotic testimony with a certain amount of skepticism. In some respects, its impact is comparable to that of testimony based on delayed recall, and rarely does it have the impact of testimony from an immediate report. In addition, jurors' judgments about hypnotically refreshed testimony affected the way they evaluated other evidence at trial: Jurors who learned that a prosecution witness had been hypnotized were less believing ofother prosecution witnesses than were jurors not exposed to hypnotic testimony. The forensic application of these findings is discussed.This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program. We thank Jane Goodman, Doug Leber, Bonnie Sawnson, Russ Wade, Karen Guest, Jonna Barsanti, Don Kline, Elaine Sullivan, and David Kuykendall for their help at various stages of the project.     

From democratic socialism to neoliberalism: the metamorphoses of the people's national party in Jamaica

Why are leftist parties in government abandoning their state-led, redistributive economic development models in favor of market-determined neoliberal ones? Conventional explanations emphasize conditionality of international financial institutiosn. This argument, though, fails to account for differences in economic policy choices across countries or within a country over time. Analyzing the social democratic People's National Party of Jamaica during two periods when it accepted IMF-mandated neoliberal economic reform measures (1977–80 and 1989-present), an alternative approach is presented to illuminate why and how leftist governments switch economic policy programs. The two time periods show that IMF conditionality might be a necessary motivation for the adoption of neoliberal economic measures, but it is not sufficient motivation. I argue that the actual policies the PNP governments employed reflect changes in the relative influence of competing factions within the party. This approach, focusing on domestic actors rather than international ones to account for economic policy shifts, highlights the ways in which politicians can manipulate institutional rules to change the relative weight of different factions within the party to gain support for policy decisions that contradict the party's traditional social democratic ideology.