Reflections on CIA Analysis: Is it Finished?

Despite the CIA's improved analytical tradecraft and increased resources, the future of its analytic mission remains in doubt. Post-9/11 improvements have been coupled with a continued focus on current intelligence priorities that minimize attention to the development of strategic research and deeper knowledge. Simply increasing the number of analysts has not produced deeper expertise. The CIA's traditional recruitment and training methods, as well as its rewards and promotion system, encourage analysts to avoid concentrating on any single area of regional or functional expertise in favor of moving around the agency to build a successful career. A continued reliance on risk-avoidance security practices also restricts analysts' contact with non-government and foreign experts who often have needed political and cultural knowledge of intelligence topics. To rectify these inadequacies, the CIA's analytic directorate needs to develop incentives for analysts who wish to develop more strategic analysis and remove the security barriers to closer collaboration with experts outside the US government. Developing cross-agency analytic collaboration would also maximize expertise and would benefit from intelligence community-wide training programs similar to what the US military does at its senior service colleges.     

Changing Emphases in the Activities of the Australian State

Paul Patton and Dianne Austin, eds, Transformations in Australian Society
Paul James, ed., The State in Question
Liz Young, Minor Parties … Minor Players: The Senate, the Minor Parties and the 1993 Budget
Gianni Zappala, Four Weddings, A Funeral and A Family Reunion: Ethnicity and Representation in Australian Federal Politics     

Australia's Quest to Enrich Uranium and the Whitlam Government's Loans Affair

The renewed debate about Australia enriching uranium raises issues associated with a previous attempt thirty‐five years ago. The Atomic Energy Commission hatched plans in the mid‐1960s to position Australia as a supplier of enriched fuel, especially to the Japanese market. This would be done using centrifuge technology, a cheaper and more efficient method than that used by the United States. That fact, along with concerns in Washington to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons, led to opposition to rival enrichment programs. Whitlam and Connor miscalculated here. Ratifying the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty was not enough to stay opposition to raising a loan designed mainly to give Australia an enrichment program.