An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs

A well-known conclusion from the standard model of litigation is that a transition from the American to the Continental rule for the allocation of legal costs will lead to an increase in the number of trials. The standard model, however, neglects the fact that the rule for allocating legal costs may also influence whether or not a potential injurer engages in a harmful activity. When this choice is endogenized, the conclusion derived from the standard model does not appear to be generally valid. A transition from the American to the Continental rule may lead to a decrease in the number of trials. Furthermore, the transition may result in an improvement in efficiency.     

One task,a few approaches,many impacts: Private-sector involvement in Canadian building code enforcement

Abstract: In response to issues about municipal-led regulatory enforcement, governments in Canada have been reforming their regimes of building regulation and control since the 1980s. As a result, private-sector inspectors were introduced as an alternative to local government control on the adherence to building regulations. However, this privatization has resulted in variations among jurisdictions. The main difference is the degree of private-sector involvement. Based on a series of interviews with forty-seven insiders, this article addresses the implications of such differences in privatization on the practice and process of building code enforcement. It draws some general lessons for the redesign of control over building regulations but at the same time warns against copy-pasting best practices.