The policy scientist of democracy revisited

A recent appraisal by Farr et al. (Am Polit Sci Rev 100:579–587 2006) credited Lasswell with raising important questions of professional responsibility for political science. However, the appraisal rejected working answers to those questions offered by Lasswell and his colleagues without considering them substantively or comprehensively. In doing so, the appraisal misleads those academics in political science and other disciplines who may be interested in a genuinely professional role for themselves, a role that takes into account the social consequences of the exercise of their knowledge and skills. This article provides a more authentic introduction to Lasswell’s life and work and vision of the policy scientist of democracy, and suggests some alternatives for would-be professionals.

“Tell It Like It Is”: Decision Making,Groupthink, and Decisiveness among U.S. Federal Subcabinet Executives

In addition to difficulties gathering and evaluating complete information, cognitive limitations and biases preclude individuals from making fully value‐maximizing choices when making decisions. It has been suggested that, done properly, involving advisors can compensate for individual‐level limitations. However, the “groupthink” tradition has highlighted ways group‐aided decision making can fail to live up to its potential. Out of this literature has emerged a paradigm Janis calls “vigilant problem‐solving.” For this article, we interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet‐level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking questions about how they made important decisions. Ten were nominated by “good‐government” experts, 10 chosen at random. We wanted to see whether there were differences in how members of those two groups made decisions, specifically, to what extent executives in the two categories used a “vigilant” process. We found, however, that similarities between the two groups overwhelmed differences: As best as we were able to measure, decision making by U.S. subcabinet executives tracks vigilant decision making recommendations fairly closely. The similarity reflects a common style of senior‐level decision making, which we theorize grows out of government bureaucracy's methodical culture. We did, however, develop evidence for a difference between outstanding executives and others on another dimension of decision making style. Outstanding executives valued decision making decisiveness—“bias for action”—more than the comparison group. Perhaps, then, what distinguishes outstanding executives from others is not vigilance but decisiveness. Contrary to the implications of the groupthink literature, the danger in government may be “paralysis by analysis” as much or more than groupthink.     

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

This paper examines individual attitudes in six industrialized democracies to determine what factors condition citizens' support for trade liberalization. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is influenced by politically driven views and individual economic utilitarian considerations. To test our propositions, we develop and estimate a series of logistic regression models of public support for trade liberalization. That data are derived from The World Values Surveys (1995–1997). We find strong empirical support for the economic utilitarian factors—primarily education, but also gender and income—as the principal factors shaping individual attitudes toward trade liberalization. Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors such as one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization, we find that the political predictors of support are weaker overall than the economic interest predictors.