The Assassination of King Abdallah: The First Political Assassination in Jordan: Did It Truly Threaten the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan?

King Abdallah was assassinated as a result of his relationship with Arab leaders. The opposition included three leaders: the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Huseini, King Faruq and Ibn Saud. Jordanian intelligence knew about the conspiracy and warned King Abdallah, but he decided to visit Jerusalem as originally planned and there he was assassinated. After the assassination on 20 July 1951, the Jordanian government was faced with two dangers that threatened the Hashemite regime in Jordan. The first, a Palestinian rebellion the purpose of which was the replacement of the Hashemite regime with a Palestinian one; the second an invasion of Jordan by either Syria or Saudi Arabia or both countries together, and their possible control of it. However, the dangers turned out to be neither tangible nor serious and the Hashemite regime remained in power.     

Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility

Using Alien Tort Claims Act suits against multinational corporations as an immediate context for discussion, this article explores the emerging field of corporate social responsibility. The article argues for an understanding of concrete legal struggles as part of broader competing strategies for regulating corporate obligations to a multitude of stakeholders. By identifying and analyzing the positions of concrete actors who operate in the field, the main thesis of this article is that the field strongly tilts in the direction of voluntary and self-reliant models of corporate responsibility. The article identifies this process as consistent with the privatization of regulative structures in general and with extant modeling of corporate governance in particular, and points at the correlation between these trends and the interests of multinational corporations.     

Guns to butter: Technology-transfer strategies in the national laboratories

The military threat to national security has substantially diminished, and the need for a stronger focus on economic competitiveness for the US is becoming more pronounced every day. We must find ways to accomplish more-effective technology transfer. This paper outlines four technology-transfer strategies used by the Department of Energy's national laboratories: the passive strategy, the active strategy, the entrepreneurial strategy, and the national-competitiveness strategy. It compares these strategies in terms of organizational structure, performance measures, and staffing, and it discusses the implications of these comparisons of technology transfer. The findings contained in this paper are based on the author's interviews with technology-transfer staff and program directors at the national laboratories and on analysis of the institutional plans.     

Deterrence and tax treatment of monetary sanctions and litigation costs

The tax treatment of monetary sanctions and litigation expenditures varies across legal jurisdictions and time. The effects of these different tax regimes – particularly, on crime deterrence – have not been fully explored. Instead, legal intuitions in court decisions and legislative reforms are found. This paper explores the effects of these tax regimes. It shows that our common intuitions are sometimes misguided, since we tend to ignore cross-effects between crime and litigation. For example, contrary to commonly held views, it is shown that non-deductibility of monetary sanctions may increase the level of crime, if litigation expenses are deductible. In addition, if deductibility of legal expenses depends only on a successful trial outcome, this may also increase amounts spent on litigation and time allocated to crime. As this paper shows, however, a complete deductibility regime, under which both monetary sanctions and litigation expenditures are deductible, maintains the pre-tax levels of crime and litigation expenditures for risk-neutral offenders. The paper further explores the effects of different tax reforms.     

Deterrence and avoidance

This paper explores the effects of public enforcement, in general, and punishment, in particular, on crime levels if offenders can engage in avoidance activities. Avoidance reduces the probability or magnitude of punishment. In general, offenders can reduce their expected punishment either by substituting legal activities for criminal activities (the deterrence effect) or by increasing avoidance activities. This paper shows that increasing the direct costs of crime – by either increasing punishment or enforcement efforts – does not necessarily deter criminal activity and may actually trigger increased crime if avoidance is possible. Furthermore, this paper shows that increasing the opportunity costs of crime (e.g. by subsidizing legal alternatives or through educational and vocational programs) reduces both crime and avoidance and thus, in this respect, is advantageous. The conditions for these outcomes are identified, the economic mechanisms are explained, and an underlying intuitive approach for these results is proposed.     

Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability

A large body of literature stresses the benefits of regime stability for economic growth in poor countries. This view, however, discounts the gains from threats to regime security when populations living under dictatorial regimes cannot benefit from the disciplining of political competition available to voters in democracies. This paper applies a model of economic growth to study the sources of the differences in economic performance and repression policy among dictatorships as well as the parallel in dictatorial regimes of the benefits achieved through political competition in democracies. Threats to the security of dictatorial regimes are shown to be a means of benefiting the population through the responses of the regime.     

Colonialism's Civilizing Mission: The Case of the Indian Hemp Drug Commission

This paper examines a particular episode in the history of British imperialism in India: the appointment of the Indian Hemp Drug Commission in 1893. We analyze the way a quasi-judicial investigation into the consumption of drugs was differently conceived and executed as a civilizing mission by, on the one hand, British colonizers, and, on the other hand, an aspiring colonized elite. By bringing together the ideological dimensions of a civilizing mission (e.g., the reliance on scientific knowledge, groper procedures, legal techniques) with its social ones (e.g., collaboration between colonizers and a local elite), we show how the very notion of a civilizing mission became a site of struggle over meaning, identity, and desirable forms of governance. The analysis reveals a local elite struggling to position itself at once on a par with British criteria of scientific competence and yet not as a mere proxy for British interests; at once able to articulate itself in terms of enlightenment concepts such as reason and modernity and yet celebrating its own distinct cultural authenticity.