The united states naval blockade of Iraq: A foreign policy and international law analysis

The current Persian Gulf crisis may signal a new period in human history in which the United Nations is viewed as the forum of first resort for the resolution of international harms and disputes. This is particularly striking since the Security Council, because of east-west divisions, has been unable to act in a collective manner to addresses serious international breaches of the peace. This two part essay deals with the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the step-by-step reaction by the U.S. Government, the imposition of the U.S. Navy blockade of Kuwaiti shipping, and the legal justification for the introduction of forces. The reader is left to decide whether the Rule of Law and Charter ideals of collective security, are the real victors in the current conflict.

Part 1 of the essay examines the detailed economic and political causes for the Iraqi invasion. Even though some commentators have characterized Saddam Hussein's entry into Kuwait as “naked aggression” which was driven by Saddam Hussein's hamartia to become the new Nasser, OPEC production disputes, allegations of excessive Kuwaiti pumping of the Rumalia oil field (straddles both countries), the need for an Iraqi coastline, and large Iraqi debt to Kuwait are seen as “rational” reasons for the invasion. A historical examination of the Iran-Iraq conflict is grafted into part one to assist the reader in appreciating the fact that belligerent conduct is viewed in Iraq as a normative mode of conflict resolution and that in the context of all current and future military and diplomatic interchanges, the proven bellicosity of Iraq should figure prominently in the approaches which are taken.

The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf must be viewed in the context of the U.S.'s diplomatic and economic interests in the region. The essay concludes that the actions of the United States in the first forty days after the Iraqi invasion were masterful because of the skilled use of the U.N. security council (to build a broad political base) as well as the introduction of limited force (imposition of a naval blockade) to signal to Saddam Hussein that the international community was serious in its resolve. The shooting which is taking place is most unfortunate; but U.S. efforts were properly tailored to keep the world coalition intact and prevent a shooting war. Until approximately 3 weeks into the actual conflict, the level of anti-U.S. rhetoric was noticeably small- a triumph for U.S. foreign policy makers in forming a world-wide consensus and maintaining it and a triumph for international respect for law.

The final portion of Part 1 deals with the history of blockades before and after the 1945 U.N. Charter. Blockade actions have been used since the Middle Ages but the 1856 Pact of Paris and the 1909 Declaration of London are the modern sources for the Law of Blockade. Becuase of the sheer intensity of conflict in the First and Second World Wars, the normative rules contained in the two written sources of law fell into disuse. Even so, most of the substantive provisions from the 19th and early 20th century doctrines are incorporated into contemporary law and policy. Commander Rosen argues strenuously for a modernization of the international conventions to codify the rules of blockade since, given the utter destructiveness of modern warfare, blockades remain a relatively benign use of force in those situations in which use of force is legally justified. But, however laudable the U.N. Charter ideals are to sharply restrict the use of force to exceptionally limited circumstances and make state aggression illegal, situations will arise in which use of force will be necessary to respond to illegal aggression. Resurrection of the old concept of pacific blockade (similar to the naval action taken in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis) is urged because unanimity in the U.N. is transitory and nations, particularly superpowers, need the legal flexibility to react to illegal aggression with limited uses of force--below the threshold uses of force authorized by the U.N. Charter.     

Les Cortes et le Parlement au Portugal. 750e anniversaire des Cortes de Leiria de 1254: Congrès International, 26–28 novembre 2004—Leiria

SUMMARY

The Scottish Parliament, established in 1999, was to be a novel type of parliament and to herald a ‘new politics’. While it was inevitable that the Scottish parliamentary model would inherit some of the features of the Westminster system, one of the major parliamentary models in the world, Home Rulers insisted on the Scottish Parliament's need to adopt novel procedures and principles right from the start to keep it from becoming a ‘Westminister’. An analysis of Scottish Home Rule discourse in documents from the late 1980s and the 1990s shows that at the time, Westminster was constructed as an ‘anti-model’. This article establishes in what respects Westminster was an anti-model for the architects of the Scottish Parliament and describes the ideal parliamentary model which they defined. It then considers whether the Scottish model as it exists today conforms to their expectations. The case presented here is that the Scottish parliamentary system is indeed different from the British system in several fundamental respects, such as the fact that it is more committee-based and less executive-oriented, but that it is closer to the Westminster model than has been acknowledged, and that in some respects, the Scottish Parliament has moved towards that model by adopting typically British modes of functioning. Some characteristics of the Westminster system which it has integrated are the Presiding Officer's power to have a casting vote or, more controversially, the way the executive is held to account, through adversarial Question Times. The Scottish Parliament is thus neither a mini-Westminster nor an anti-Westminster: the Scottish parliamentary model is a hybrid of the West European and the Westminster models.     

Law From Below: Women's Human Rights and Social Movements in New York City

Despite the ambivalent history of the domestic application of human rights in the United States, human rights increasingly offer important resources for American grassroots activists. Within the constraints of U.S. policy toward human rights, they provide social movements a kind of global law "from below": a form of cosmopolitan law that subalterns can use to challenge their subordinate position. Using a case study from New York City, we argue that in certain contexts, human rights can provide important political resources to U.S. social movements. However, they do so in a diffuse way far from the formal system of human rights law. Instead, activists adopt some of the broader social justice ideas and strategies embedded within human rights practice.     

Duverger's Laws: Between social and institutional determinism

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to relocate Duverger's Laws within the debate about the effects of electoral systems on the number of parties. Although Duverger's theory has always been seen as the best example of a purely institutionalist approach to the issue, it is possible to argue that this is only true if one overemphasises the meaning of the laws without considering Duverger's justification and explanations for them. However, if one takes into consideration not only the laws, but also Duverger's theories about the effects of electoral systems on the number of parties as a whole, one can argue that his theses do not have a purely institutionalist character and can therefore coexist with theories that try to take into account variables other than electoral rules.