Administrative devolution and accountability: the case of the non-profit housing program

Abstract: The problem of bureaucratic accountability has received considerable attention in the literature of public administration, but few studies have considered the extent to which extra-governmental agencies are held accountable to governments or legislatures. This paper examines administrative devolution and the problem of accountability, using the non-profit housing program as an example. It argues that devolution of programs, without adjusting for the resulting loss of bureaucratic control, leaves governments with little information about, or control over, the people who make decisions about large expenditures of public funds. It concludes that if the advantages of using the voluntary sector for social service delivery are to outweigh the problems of reduced accountability, forms of control -such as incentives for compliance and internal professional standards - which do not limit the autonomy of these groups, but which can enhance pre-audit accountability, need to be developed. Sommaire: Si le problème de la responsabilité bureaucratique a fait I'objet de nombreuses études dans les textes de I'administration publique, peu d'entre elles, en revanche, ont pris en considération la mesure dans laquelle les organismes paragouvernementaux sont tenus de rendre des comptes aux gouvernements ou législatures. Cet article examine la décentralisation administrative et les problèmes de responsabilités, en utilisant comme exemple le programme de logement à but non lucratif. Il suggere que la décentralisation des programmes, sans ajustement qui tienne compte de la perte de contrôle bureaucratique en résultant, laisse les gouvernements avec peu de renseignements ou de contrôle sur les personnes qui prennent des décisions concernant d'importantes dépenses de fonds public. En conclusion, I'auteure dit que, si les avantages résultant de I'utilisation du secteur bénévole pour fournir les services sociaux doivent I'emporter sur les problèmes de diminution de la responsabilité, il faut mettre en place certaines mesures de contrôle (tels les encouragements à se conformer à des normes professionnelles internes), qui ne restreindraient par I'autonomie de ces groupes, mais pourraient accroître la responsabilité avant le contrôle.     

Active living and biking: tracing the evolution of a biking system in Arlington, Virginia

In Arlington, Virginia, a steady evolutionary change in biking policy during the last three decades has yielded some of the nation's best biking assets. It has a comprehensive, well-connected, highly integrated, well-mapped, and well-signed system of shared-use paved trails, bike lanes, bike routes, and other biking assets, such as workplace showers. Understanding the conditions that led to Arlington's current biking system can provide lessons in the strategy and tactics of active-living politics. One potentially effective political strategy that was successful in Arlington is for activists to pressure elected officials to select professional managers who see bike-ways as crucial to the overall transportation system. Then it is important to formalize the government-citizen relationship through an advisory panel. Also, in Arlington, the incremental creation of biking assets helped create demand for more and better facilities. In turn, this created political support for expanding and upgrading. Finally, Arlington used potentially negative circumstances (e.g., the building of highway corridors, the introduction of the Metro) as opportunities to change the built environment in ways that have encouraged more active living.     

Industrial structure of the federal sector: Evidence from bureau market share data

This paper examines the industrial organization of the federal sector by measuring the variation of bureau market shares of appropriations. The two measures employed are rank-shift analysis (turnover) and the Hymer-Pashigian index of market share instability which have been used to indicate the level of competitiveness within private sector industries. The results of both the rank-shift and market share instability analyses strongly suggest that there is considerable competition among bureaus within the federal sector. These results are consistent with the hypothesis and existing evidence that bureaus engage in nonprice competitive strategies.     

Marketing,truth and political expediency

• Countries have been built on the hopes, dreams and courage of refugees. In recent years, the global refugee problem has become more intense, and reactions from governments around the world have been generally negative. This paper explores and describes the way in which a hitherto unpopular Australian Government managed and communicated an apparent ‘refugee crisis’ to win an election campaign, using information known at the time to be untruthful. It compares the messages used to win the election with the truth that subsequently emerged, and relates this to political marketing, especially the theories of Machiavelli. It concludes by describing the situation post‐election and discusses some potential implications for public affairs.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.