‘Respect for Law and Sausages’: How Parliament Made Section 31 of the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 on the Sale of Employment Rights

The Parliamentary debates on the clause which became section 31 of the Growth and Enterprise Act 2013 (allowing employees to agree to sign away employment rights for shares in the employing company) show that scrutiny by the House of Commons is very poor, and that scrutiny by the House of Lords is intense and very well‐informed. If the Government loses the argument on a Bill in the House of Lords, it will lose the vote. However, during Parliamentary ping‐pong (the back‐and‐forth process of amendment of a Bill between the two Houses) the Commons, and the Government, will normally get their way, however weak the policy proposal, provided that concessions on detail are made, unless the issue is regarded by the Lords as one of fundamental principle.     

CHILD PROTECTION MEDIATION: THE COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE—A JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE

The Child Protection Mediation Program in Cook County, Illinois is the result of a collaborative effort on the part of the court, its stakeholders, and the attorneys involved in child protection cases. Child protection mediation empowers families and includes parents in many decisions impacting their children. It also helps judges to move children's cases through the legal system more rapidly and in a more efficient and humane manner. This results in children achieving more timely permanency. The program is sustained in part due to frequent outreach to, and input from, the program's consumers. These help to ensure that the program is meeting the diverse needs of the court, the families, and the professionals involved in the cases.     

Environmental management and street-level regulators: A cultural trap?

It has been argued that environmental management is in an administrative trap. Numerous factors leading to this trapped situation have already been identified in the literature: institutional rigidity, lack of co-ordination, formalization, non-accountability and political interference. This study focusses on the organizational, cultural dimension of the administrative trap and argues that in order to reform administrative structures, the organizational culture must also be reformed. On the basis of several face-to-face interviews with street-level environmental regulators in Hong Kong, the study claims that a role-oriented, hierarchical culture exists. While such an organizational culture is in perfect agreement with existing administrative arrangements, it may, in the end, hamper the effectiveness of environmental management.