Virtual forensic anthropology: Novel applications of anthropometry and technology in a child death case

Full-body 3D virtual reconstructions were generated using 3D technology and anthropometry following the death of a young girl, allegedly from severe malnutrition as a result of abuse and neglect. Close range laser scanning, in conjunction with full colour digital texture photography, was used to document the child's condition shortly after death in order to demonstrate the number and pattern of injuries and to be able to demonstrate her condition forensically. Full-body digital reconstructions were undertaken to illustrate the extent of the malnutrition by comparing the processed post mortem scans with reconstructed images at normal weight for height and age. This is the first known instance of such an investigative tool.     

"No compensation" or "pro compensation": Moore v. Regents and default rules for human tissue donations

The much studied case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California is often considered important in property law for denying property rights in human tissue. This widespread misunderstanding of Moore has not only misplaced the legal emphasis of human tissue donations on property law instead of contract law, but has also hindered the creation of a much-needed default rule governing the issue of compensation for donated tissue. While it is possible that the majority of donors rarely consider compensation as an incentive to donate, without a legally recognized default rule the law remains blurred as to what contractual provisions apply to the exchange between donor and researcher. This Article argues that the solution is a weak default rule of no compensation that may be overridden by evidence that the parties intended otherwise.     

A Political Theory of Blackmail: A Reply to Professor Dripps

This essay was originally presented at the Rutgers Institute for Law and Philosophy as part of the Symposium on The Evolution of Criminal Law Theory. It is a Reply to Professor Donald Dripps’ politically-based justification for blackmail’s prohibition. Under Dripps’ account, by exacting payment from the victim blackmail is an impermissible form of private punishment that usurps the state’s public monopoly on law enforcement. This essay demonstrates that Dripps’ account is either under-inclusive or over-inclusive or both. Dripps’ account is applied to a number of the standard blackmail scenarios by which theories of blackmail are typically assessed. Dripps’ account is under-inclusive by failing to treat as blackmail Victim-Welcomed Blackmail, Non-Monetary Blackmail, Rebuffed Blackmail, and Non-Informational Blackmail which the law considers as blackmail. And it is over-inclusive by treating as blackmail Victim-Initiated Exchange and Unconditional Disclosure which the law does not recognize as blackmail.     

“Undoing” (or Symbolic Reversal) at Homicide Crime Scenes

A closed case file review of a nonrandom national sample of 975 homicides disclosed 11 cases (1.13%) of undoing, wherein offenders engaged in crime scene behavior that has been considered an attempt to symbolically reverse the murder. The frequency of the various methods of undoing involved the use of blankets to cover the victim's body (55%), positioning the body (55%), use of a bed or couch (42%), washing the body (36%), using pillows (36%), as well as removing clothing and adding other types of adornments (27%). Ten of the 11 offenders were male, and one was female; all 12 victims were female. Ten of the 12 victims were family members or relationship intimates. These findings are consistent with prior reports which concluded that the motivation for undoing behavior is an attempt to compensate for guilt or remorse for having committed the homicide.     

The Unanimous Voting Rule is not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange

The unanimous voting rule is often viewed as analogous tovoluntary market exchange. This paper demonstrates that whenthird-party pecuniary effects exist, this analogy breaks downbecause unlike markets, unanimous voting requires compensationfor these effects. Thus, efficient market outcomes typically willbe rejected by the unanimous voting rule. Even when transactionscosts are low enough to make compensation feasible, the political outcome under unanimity will differ from the market outcome. The distributional effects of unanimityprovide the incentive for people to substitute rent-seekingbehavior for productive activity, and reduce the incentive forproductive change, providing additional reasons why a less-than-unanimous voting rule may be optimal when resources are to beallocated politically.     

Internationalism and Commitment at the Kitchen Table

The contributors to this issue focus on legal internationalism (Peroni 2016; Turan 2016), including hybrid mixes with nationalist forms (Sankey 2016). They have provoked us as editors to think more about these sites and forms of engagement. Sankey shows how civic participation in the ECCC has played a key role in surfacing the gendered harms of separation and starvation. Turan highlights the problems with ICC exclusion of the experience of men and boys from sexual violence. Peroni expresses her hesitations over the Istanbul Convention given an association between assumed vulnerability and migrant women, while admiring its uncoupling of violence and culture. Cruz’s interview with Wendy Brown (2016) contextualizes and expands on these themes as they consider, with other participants, the future of feminist theory in the context of neo-liberal capturing of rights and legal space. Thinking more about internationalism and commitment in this context also helps us hold a mirror up to ourselves as we reflect more critically on our own naming of FLS as an ‘international’ journal. Together these contributions, and the reviews of new work, play a role in fleshing out an editorial commitment to enacting the journal as a living thing that ‘hangs together somehow’ (Mol 2002) even as it is known differently in different places.     

Government subsidies to private spending on public goods

This paper examines how the size of an efficient subsidy varies with the amount of free-riding and the presence of distorting taxation. Ironically, the existence of free-riding, where some individuals make no voluntary contribution at all, reduces the size of an efficient subsidy and makes a subsidy more attractive compared to direct taxation. For the gain to be significant, the number of donors must be extremely few in number. Even when the gains from a subsidy relative to direct taxation are small, a subsidy may dominate direct taxation because it can reveal an efficient level of the public good. The analysis distinguishes between traditional public goods such as national defense, and what I call transfer public goods, where members of society care about the consumption of a particular group in society such as the poor. I generalize the Samuelson (1954) results to derive conditions for efficiency in providing transfer public goods.