Focus of attention and locus of control as moderators of fraternal justice effects

The influence of a colleague's performance outcomes on individual's own subsequent performance was investigated. Internal and external locus of control subjects were given information about another person's outcome which indicated two things about organizational standards: how easy or difficult they were to meet and how stringently they were applied. An attentional focus manipulation was employed to influence how subjects used this information. Half of the subjects received a group-focus manipulation and the other half a self-focus one. We proposed that perceived difficulty of standards and stringency of application would interact with attentional focus and subject locus of control to alter subject's own subsequent performances. This expectation was supported by the data. Theoretical and applied implications of this result are discussed.     

Computer-Aided Instruction in Law: Theories, Techniques, and Trepidations

Legal education is only beginning to make use of the technological capabilities of computers as a medium for instructional design. In this article the authors show the applicability of computer-assisted instruction to law through programmed instructional techniques. They trace the two decades of development of computer-assisted instruction (CAI) in law, the use and misuse of the computer's capabilities, the impact of CAI on law student attitudes and performance, and the positive student endorsement. They carefully analyze the computer's capacity for use in memory drills, tutorial sessions, and simulation exercises. They do not offer an unrestricted endorsement of the computer's capabilities but hope for the continuing development of CAI in the legal education process.     

Incentives and beneficence

Whether an action is beneficent may depend on its effect on incentives for future behavior of the beneficiary. This strategic consideration makes our moral account of beneficence far more complex than most discussions suggest. Its effect on utilitarian and Kantian moral theories is discussed. In general, strategic incentive considerations recommend institutional rather than individual resolution of many problems, so that moral theory must in part be political and institutional.