A Priori Voting Power: What Is It All About?

We explain the meaning of a priori voting power and outline how it is measured. We distinguish two intuitive notions as to what voting power means, leading to two approaches to measuring it. One conception, I-power, focuses on a voter's potential influence over the outcome of decisions by a voting body. The second conception, P-power, focuses on voters' payoff, their expected share of a fixed winning 'prize'. We discuss and rebut some philosophical and pragmatic objections, according to which a priori (as distinct from actual) voting power is worthless or inapplicable.     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

Cross-National Concepts in Supranational Governance: State–Society Relations and EU Policy Making

The emergence of multiple and shifting modes of governance both intranationally and supranationally has posed difficulties for analysts accustomed to refining or testing singular types of politics. When confronted with this changing complexity, a comprehensive framework can be a very useful diagnostic and organizational tool. This article devises one such conceptual framework to clarify and systematize varieties of state autonomy and state–society relations. By combining fundamental conceptions of action, elemental control mechanisms, and basic types of interaction, a comprehensive framework is constructed for characterizing and comparing governance modes in a conceptually coherent manner. Many of the abstract spaces within this conceptual field share affinities with types of state autonomy and state–society relations depicted in major theoretical approaches to national politics (i.e., authoritarianism, statism, pluralism, corporatism, institutionalism, and Marxism). This article uses this conceptual framework to systematize these major governance modes and to illuminate their coexistence in supranational governance by examining the European Union policy process.     

Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries

The good governance agenda is unrealistically long and growing longer over time. Among the multitude of governance reforms that "must be done" to encourage development and reduce poverty, there is little guidance about what's essential and what's not, what should come first and what should follow, what can be achieved in the short term and what can only be achieved over the longer term, what is feasible and what is not. If more attention is given to sorting out these questions, "good enough governance" may become a more realistic goal for many countries faced with the goal of reducing poverty. Working toward good enough governance means accepting a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what's working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation seriously; and grounding action in the contextual realities of each country.     

Mixed electoral rules’ impact on party systems

The growing literature about mixed electoral systems has addressed their effect on party systems, voting behavior, campaign strategies, legislative roll-call voting, and other issues in a handful of countries. But, the effect of mixed systems has not been fully evaluated cross-nationally or longitudinally. Using data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, we address this gap in the literature by investigating two related questions. First, do mixed electoral rules produce different election outcomes than other election rules? Second, are these results attenuated by the definitions of mixed systems that scholars employ? We find that mixed systems generate outcomes that are distinct from other electoral systems and that these findings are generally robust across different definitions.     

A Party of a Different Color? Race,Campaign Communication,and Party Politics

Although studies have examined the contents of party images and the impact of those images on candidate evaluations, we do not have an understanding of the conditions that lead to party image change. In this article, I examine the impact of racialized campaigns on perceptions of individuals' party images. Moreover, I explore the factors that mediate the campaigns' effects. I argue that the success of a strategy's ability to alter party images depends on the strength of the individuals' extant party images. Using the 2000 Republican National Convention as a case study, I find that party images are indeed malleable. Further, I find that race, party identification, and education mediate party image change.     

Does merit pay reward good teachers? Evidence from a randomized experiment

A common criticism of merit‐pay plans is that they fail to systematically target rewards to the most effective teachers. This study presents new evidence on this issue by evaluating data from Tennessee's Career Ladder Evaluation System and the Project STAR class‐size experiment. Because the students and teachers participating in the experiment were randomly assigned, inferences about the relative quality of teachers certified by the career ladder should be unbiased. The results indicate that Tennessee's career ladder had mixed success in rewarding teachers who increased student achievement. Assignment to career‐ladder teachers increased mathematics scores by roughly 3 percentile points but generally had smaller and statistically insignificant effects on reading scores. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Book reviews

Journal of Chinese Political Science -     

Market Visions: The Interplay of Ideas and Institutions in Chinese Financial Restructuring

In studies of transitional systems, negative economic outcomes are often associated with 'partial' or 'stalled' reform – a reform that signifies an institutional departure from standard market operation. Such departures are often traced to socio-political contestation or political preferences. Focusing on China's intertwined financial and enterprise reforms, this paper challenges that approach on two fronts. First, it argues that institutional change and resultant economic outcomes are driven less by contestation than by societally held assumptions regarding the nature of economic causation in market contexts. The analytical lenses that actors employ to understand their environment shape expectations about how markets function, influence the manner by which economic problems are diagnosed, and profoundly affect the ultimate institutional evolution of the system. Second, such lenses are necessitated by substantial uncertainties at the theoretical level regarding market function – uncertainties that make characterizations of economic behavior as 'irrational' highly problematic.