Michels Revisited: Autonomous Cliques in a Small Political System: The Norwegian Institute for Atomic Energy (IFA), 1949-79

Elite autonomy is often discussed in relation to oligarchic tendencies within organizations. The article demonstrates how autonomy of elites may have a more stable basis if it rests on inter-elite support. The focus is on the role of autonomous, tightly coupled, and exclusive elite networks characterized by jointly held perceptions and reciprocity – cliques – in a small political system, such as in Norway. The argument is based on a study of the Norwegian Institute of Atomic Energy and its political environment, 1949–79. The formation and survival of autonomous cliques are stimulated by properties of small and tightly knit political systems: (1) transciency, (2) scarcity of qualified personnel, (3) consensus on national goals, and (4) elites' need to protect themselves from judgements based on strong egalitarian norms. The existence of autonomous cliques in a policy area has important implications for: (1) political entrepreneurship, (2) organizational development, and (3) legitimacy in relation to the environment. The management and control via informal clique organization have received little attention. Thus, this study serves as a supplement to the literature on bureaucratic politics and organization theory.     

Political-economic aspects of public employment

Abstract. An examination of public employment and expenditure data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1963–1983 reveals decelerating growth in public employment after 1970, whereas expenditure growth rates have been accelerating. Two contrary tendencies in public sector employment since the early 1970s are apparent: a general decline in goods and market services, and a significant increase in communal and social services. Comparative empirical analysis, using a pooled cross section-time series technique, confirms the important contribution of increasing wealth to public employment growth. Similarly, a strong societal position for organised labour and increasing unemployment rates contribute to public employment growth, thereby suggesting the presence of a discretionary stabilization policy. Contrary to expectations, however, increased trade dependence exerts a negative impact. With regard to the relationship between expenditure and employment, a general increase in the employment creation efficiency of spending can be discerned. Empirical estimates again suggest that the importance of labour in political-economic decision-making has intensified the employment creation effect of public spending.     

INCREASING THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF SEPARATED, DIVORCED, AND WIDOWED WOMEN OVER AGE THIRTY

Data from the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey and the Current Population Survey were used to estimate the effects of CETA, a governmental jobs program, on the economic well-being of separated, divorced, and widowed women over age thirty. After training, CETA participants had increases in earnings and tended to have higher earnings than comparable CPS respondents. Participants in on-the-job training and public service employment had greater increases than participants in the other CETA programs. CETA enrollees with a high school degree had greater increases in earnings than those who had not completed high school, while whites had greater increases in earnings than non-whites.     

Local Government Procurement of CPA Audit Services: The Role of the States

Recent studies have raised serious concerns about the quality of governmental audits by independent CPAs. Part of the problem is that many governmental units do not use effective audit procurement procedures. This article examines current state guidelines for the procurement of CPA audit services by local governments and recommends an expansion of the states' role in this area.     

Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians

This paper analyzes principal-agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters, challengers, and incumbents. The introduction of a last period (via finite-livedness) in combination with voters' imperfect information about politicians' preferences causes time-varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians. Political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences, potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments. In the extreme, sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office. A systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist, and depends on how quickly sorting takes place. We show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences. In addition, if sorting is a significant feature of political markets, cross-sectional studies will tend to oversample little- and non-shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies. Reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed.We wish to thank John Bond, Donald Deere, Gertrud Fremling, Tim Gronberg, Michael Munger, Russell Roberts, and the participants of workshops at Dartmouth College, Texas A&M University, University of Houston, University of Texas, Yale Law School, and the 1987 Public Choice Meetings for valuable discussions on earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was issued as working paper E-87-34 by the Hoover Institution. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Sentencing Commission nor those of any of its Commissioners. Any remaining errors are of course our own.     

On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option

We examine whether nations, faced with the threat of terrorism, will be motivated to engage in the efficient amount of retaliation against terrorists. We demonstrate that the problem confronting the efforts of nations to achieve an optimal retaliation against terrorists is understated by the traditional free-rider analysis. In particular, nations have the option of actually selling or reducing the public good of retaliation, provided through the efforts of others, by offering safe havens to terrorists in return for the terrorists' pledge to attack elsewhere. This paid-rider behavior is also shown to apply to other public good scenarios.The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Gordon Tullock on an earlier draft. Sole responsibility for the paper's content rests with the authors. Todd Sandler's research was supported by a Science and Humanities Research Institute Summer Grant at Iowa State University.     

Book reviews

Islamic homeland, soviet section

Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State. London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983, 170 pp. Cloth, £12.95. ISBN 0–7099–0619–6.

Islam Today: the USSR

T. S. Saidbaev, Islam: istoriia i sovremennost. Moscow: Znanie, 1985, 64 pp., 47,290 copies. Series Nauchnyi Ateizm, No. 11, 1985.