Slavery,Partisanship, and Procedure in the U.S. House: The Gag Rule, 1836–1845

From the 24th through the 28th Congresses, the House of Representatives operated under versions of a “gag rule” that blocked petitions dealing with abolition and related matters. This article presents the gag rule as not only a historically important window into slavery deliberations in Congress but also a case study in majority party restrictions of minority rights—and in the boundaries that constituency politics can place on majority power. Through analysis of vote choices and voting changes over time, I demonstrate that the gag rule's partisan origins gave way as northern members voted against party and with specific constituency pressures as well as general sectional sentiment. The gag rule shows the power of electoral considerations and constituency in the early U.S. House, and it also illustrates the force that constituency can have over majority procedural maneuvering.     

Said and Unsaid: State Legislative Signaling to State Courts over Same Sex Marriage 1990–2004

From 1990 through 2004, same sex marriage emerged as a major policy issue. In responding to this controversial policy issue, many state legislatures demonstrated unusual behavior. A substantial minority of state legislatures continued to introduce new legislative bills on this topic long after the legal position of the respective state would indicate that the state had articulated a recognized and settled policy. In this article, we propose that the apparently aberrant behavior of these state legislatures can be explained in part by consideration of legislative signaling directed toward state courts. Specifically, we consider the attempt of state legislators to discourage intervention by the state courts around some policy issues.     

Long‐Term Change and Stability in House Voting Decisions: The Case of the Minimum Wage

Although members of Congress exhibit considerable stability in their voting decisions on similar, recurring issues, members' long‐term voting histories reveal evidence of systematic instability as well. I argue that members reverse positions in predictable ways when the vote history loses value as a decision cue, and I present empirical evidence for this behavior in the context of the highly salient and regularly repeated House decisions on increasing the federal minimum wage. The empirical findings suggest that reversals of member positions are related to institutional, electoral, and constituency factors. I conclude by discussing the importance of these findings to understanding congressional decision making and representation.     

The Revitalization of Islamic Penal Law: An Examination of Its Opponents

There is an increasing interest today in reestablishing Islamic Penal Law in most Middle East countries. The majority of the population apparently favors this change. There are, however, a minority opposed to such changes. This paper examines how those opposed to reinstituting Islamic Penal Law differ from others based on data gathered from 600 respondents in Kuwait. The findings indicate that those most opposed to such a change are the upper or upper middle class. They apparently are opposed not only to reestablishing Islamic Penal Law but also are less orthodox Muslems. They have had considerable more contact with the Western world but are a small but important minority in their society.