Stochastic Models of Crime Rates

Empirical-stochastic models of index crimes are developed in ten major metropolitan areas. Detailed examples of the model building and forecasting ability of the models are illustrated. Characteristics of the resulting model forms are briefly discussed relative to their use in forecasting and resource assignment in criminal justice planning. The existence of uniform underlying causal mechanisms for given crime types are also discussed from re-occurring model forms.     

CONSTITUTIVE CRIMINOLOGY: THE MATURATION OF CRITICAL THEORY*

This paper synthesizes recent trends in the development of critical criminology into a new theoretical direction in thinking about crime. It rejects approaches to criminological theory that reduce crime to an outcome of micro causes or macro contexts. It suggests instead that thinking about crime should be reconsidered as the coterminous discursive production by human agents of an ideology of crime that sustains it as a concrete reality. It argues that this coproduction occurs when agents act out criminal patterns, when others seek to control criminal behavior, and when yet others attempt to research, philosophize about, and explain crime. The paper argues that reducing crime will only come about with a reduction of investment by human agents in the ideology of crime production. Such a reflexive re-conceptualization requires the development of a replacement discourse, rather than an oppositional one, a peacemaking discourse rather than a conflicting one. We call this new theoretical direction constitutive criminology.     

Exploring Explanations of State Agency Budgets: Institutional Budget Actors or Exogenous Environment?

Budgetary incrementalism argues that three institutional actors—agencies, executive budget offices, and legislative committees—dominate budget outcomes. The complexity and interdependency of public programs expands this expectation to include the influence of exogenous budget factors. Findings from a survey of state agency heads reveal that budget environments do influence state agency budget outcomes. However, the institutional budgetary participants, especially governors and legislatures, envisioned in classical incrementalism retain their principal and primary influence on state agency budgets. A significant departure from classical incrementalism is that agencies are not as influential as previously depicted.     

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations,Political Principals' Priorities,and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.