On Logic in the Law: “Something,but not All”

Abstract. In 1880, when Oliver Wendell Holmes (later to be a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) criticized the “logical theology” of law articulated by Christopher Columbus Langdell (the first Dean of Harvard Law School), neither Holmes nor Langdell was aware of the revolution in logic that had begun, the year before, with Frege's Begriffsschrift. But there is an important element of truth in Holmes's insistence that a legal system cannot be adequately understood as a system of “axioms and corollaries”; and this element of truth is not obviated by the more powerful logical techniques that are now available.     

The Pluralistic Universe of Law: Towards a Neo‐Classical Legal Pragmatism*

After a brief sketch of the history of philosophical pragmatism generally, and of legal pragmatism specifically (section 1), this paper develops a new, neo‐classical legal pragmatism: a theory of law drawing in part on Holmes, but also on ideas from the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy. Main themes are the “pluralistic universe” of law (section 2); the evolution of legal systems (section 3); the place of logic in the law (section 4); and the relation of law and morality (section 5).     

COURTYARDS－CONFUCIAN OR WHAT？

I lean on the southern window and let my pride expandI consider how easy it is to be content with a small spaceEveryday I stroll in my garden for pleasure...And walk round my lonely pine tree, stroking it. -Tao Yuanming, 4th century AD     

EVALUATION OF THE PAINT CREEK YOUTH CENTER: A RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM FOR SERIOUS DELINQUENTS*

A classic experimental design was used to determine whether youths assigned to a small experimental program, designed to offer a comprehensive and highly structured array of intervention services and activities, actually received significantly different treatment, and performed better, than control youths assigned to traditional training schools. Interviews with staff and youths suggest that the experimental program did deliver significantly more treatment services. One-year follow-up data showed no significant differences in arrests or self-reported delinquency between experimental and control groups, although those who completed the experimental program performed significantly better than those who were removed for disciplinary reasons.     

Reexamining the Institutional Effects of Term Limits in U.S. State Legislatures

Research on term limits suggests that they have substantial consequences for the power of legislatures vis‐à‐vis the executive and interest groups and for the relationship between leaders and rank‐and‐file members within a chamber. Existing work, however, has not accounted for the actual power of relevant state actors. We contribute to this research by examining the effect of term limits on the influence of institutional actors conditional on the existing political power structure in a state. The inclusion of controls for the direct and moderating effect of actual institutional power suggests some significant extensions of previous findings regarding the institutional effects of term limits.     

Parties,Preferences, and Petitions: Discharge Behavior in the Modern House

Although discharge petitions lie at the confluence of personal preferences, committee prerogatives, and party leadership in Congress, these procedures have received little scholarly scrutiny. We capitalize on the public nature of petition signatures since 1993 to examine the behavior of the most cross‐pressured members in discharge battles: bill sponsors and cosponsors belonging to the majority party who personally prefer the bills they have sponsored but who face party pressure not to sign the petitions that threaten the leadership's control of the legislative agenda. After controlling for personal preferences, we find a statistically significant partisan effect in the U.S. House, which further illuminates the “Where's the party?” debate.     

THE AVAILABILITY OF LAW

This article explores the practical skills that agents in the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office of Consumer Protection develop to accomplish their mandated objectives. In the situational structure and processes of discretionary decision making, we find a persistent surplus of enforcement capacity. Although the consumer protection law establishes a variety of sanctions and legal procedures to be used in enforcing the statute, agents frequently invoke infractions of other laws in the course of resolving consumer complaints. They have this flexibility only because laws, in general, are imperfectly enforced. This leaves scope in a particular situation for the invocation of a wide variety of potential violations of, for example, safety and building codes, zoning or license rules, and tax laws, all remotely if at all related to consumer protection. This article demonstrates the skill with which consumer protection officials exercise this discretion and argues that an adequate conception of the role of law ought to take account of the different ways in which law enforcement agents draw from this reservoir of un-enforced law.