Reforming Justice by Geography; Organizational Responses to the Problem of Juvenile Crime

Growing public sentiment over the problem of juvenile crime has resulted in an administrative focus on "toughening" and rationalizing the sanctions for serious offenders. Our analysis of ten states examines two measures of organizational power, discretion and jurisdiction, to specify the changing mandate of juvenile justice. A typology of reorganization strategies is developed which consists of three "policy change" categories—regulation, negotiation, and displacement. Our findings have implications for defining the recent reforms in juvenile justice, distinguishing patterns within seemingly random geographical variation, and anticipating further directions in the control of serious youthful offenders.     

China's Recovery: Why the Writing Was Always on the Wall

China has been a major power for far longer than is typically acknowledged in the West. This paper seeks to redress established discourse of China as a 'rising' power which now enjoys common usage within Western policy-making, academic and popular circles, particularly within the United States; China can more accurately be conceived of as a 'recovering power'. A tendency by successive Washington administrations to view the world in realist terms has forced the label of 'rising' power onto China along with the negative connotations that inevitably follow. We should acknowledge the folly in utilising a theoretical approach largely devoid of any appreciation for the social and human dimensions of international relations as well as the importance of social discourse in the field. Finally, policy-makers in Washington must reconsider their realist stance and, with a fuller appreciation of world history, recognise that American hegemony was always destined to be short-lived.     

Education in Africa

This article represents the larger part of a lecture by theformer Principal of Makerere at a joint meeting with The RoyalEmpire Society on the 26th January, W. E. F. Ward, AssistantAdviser on Education, being in the chair. Mr. Turner, who isnow Headmaster of Charterhouse, was Master of Marlborough beforegoing to Africa in 1939.     

Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s

This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.