The efficiency of the demarking point of the femoral head as a sex determining parameter

The percentage of skeletal remains that can be sexed depends on the degree of completeness of the skeleton, the parameters that are used and the type of statistical analysis that is done. The objective of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the demarking point in sexing the femur of South African whites and blacks. One hundred pairs of femurs were randomly selected from the bone collections of each of the two racial groups. The bones were sexed by measuring the head diameters and comparing them with the corresponding demarking point values that had been previously determined. The sex that was so allocated to each bone was compared with its documented sex in the database in order to assess the accuracy of the method. The overall success rate of sex identification was 32% for both white and black populations, but the accuracy of sexing was 100%.     

Computing Nash Equilibria in Probabilistic, Multiparty Spatial Models with Nonpolicy Components

Although there exist extensive results concerning equilibriain spatial models of two-party elections with probabilisticvoting, we know far less about equilibria in multiparty elections—i.e.,under what conditions will equilibria exist, and what are thecharacteristics of equilibrium configurations? We derive conditionsthat guarantee the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium anddevelop an algorithm to compute that equilibrium inmultipartyelections with probabilistic voting, in which voters chooseaccording to the behaviorists' fully specified multivariatevote model. Previously, such computations could only be approximatedby laborious search methods. The algorithm, which assumes aconditional logit choice function, can be applied to spatialcompetition for a variety of party objectives including vote-maximizationand margin-maximization, and can also encompass alternativevoter policy metrics such as quadratic and linear loss functions.We show that our conditions for an equilibrium are plausiblegiven the empirically-estimated parameters that behavioristsreport for voting behavior in historical elections. We alsoshow that parties' equilibrium positions depend not only onthe distribution of voters' policy preferences but also on theirnonpolicy-related attributes such as partisanship and sociodemographicvariables. Empirical applications to data from a recent Frenchelection illustrate the use of the algorithm and suggest thata unique Nash equilibrium existed in that election.     

Analyzing linked systems of negotiations

This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the structure and dynamics of what the authors call linked systems of negotiations. Even such seemingly straightforward transactions as the purchase of a family car tend to involve linked negotiations. The framework highlights the importance of internegotiation processes in shaping Zones of Possible Agreement, and proposes a typology of linkage. By mapping out and reengineering linked systems, negotiators can enhance their ability to shape the structure within which their negotiations take place.     

Prevention of money laundering and the role of asset recovery

The purpose of this paper is to examine the increasing emphasis of the UK anti-money laundering (AML) legislative framework, on the financial arrangements of criminals. Our qualitative study engaged key stakeholders from the AML environment through a series of focus groups. This included law enforcement; accountants; prosecutors; bankers and, importantly, ex-offenders. We argue that the inclusion of the views of a traditionally hard to reach group of ex-offenders, adds significantly to knowledge and understanding about effectiveness of AML. The research findings suggest that, at first glance, the focus on asset recovery has been successful. However, our respondents shared with us areas of tension and inconsistencies in application of the law, in particular between police and the courts. For example, whether it was better to prosecute the predicate offence  separately or in addition to the offence of money laundering; or whether to pursue criminal or civil recovery. We further find that criminals have been able to use their knowledge to circumvent the system, suggesting that greater effort is needed to promote cooperation, rather than competition, in successfully detecting and prosecuting offenders.     

The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.