How Movement Strength Matters: Social Movement Strength and the Implementation of Ethnodevelopment Policy in Ecuador and Peru

Why has Ecuador been much more successful at implementing participatory policy than Peru despite the similarity between the two countries’ policies and despite their similarly low state capacity? To answer this question, this article draws on insights from implementation literature that point to factors such as incentives written into policy, the commitment of administrations and bureaucratic agencies, and few veto points in the chain of implementation. While this article does not challenge such findings, it suggests that we must look further back in the causal chain to understand what brings such facilitating conditions about. Through an examination of ethnodevelopment policy in Ecuador and Peru, I find that the strength of social movements is most responsible for creating the conditions that foster implementation. Neither civil society nor the state alone can bring about successful participatory policy implementation. Rather, strong social movements can make the state comply with its own laws.     

Measuring the Effectiveness of New Approaches to Housing Support Policy for Persons with Disabilities

Housing support policy for persons with disabilities who require access to 24‐hour formal or informal support is changing throughout Australia. This is consistent with international trends including: independent living in generic housing; facilitating choices about where and with whom people live; individualised home‐based support; and community integration. Are these trends leading to policies that are effective in the Australian context? This article presents a framework for analysing the effectiveness of new approaches to housing support using a rights perspective. The framework consists of four domains: client outcomes; administrative systems; service viability; and coordination between formal and informal carers. Applying the framework to six case studies found that they all aim to foster independence, while providing effective individualised, holistic housing support.     

DNA recovery after sequential processing of latent fingerprints on copy paper

Forensic examiners must determine whether both latent fingerprint development and DNA profiling can be performed on the same area of an evidence item and, if only one is possible, which examination offers the best chance for identification. Latent fingerprints can be enhanced by targeting different components of fingerprint residues with sequential chemical treatments. This study investigated the effects of single-reagent and sequential latent fingerprint development processes on downstream DNA analysis to determine the point at which latent fingerprint development should be stopped to allow for DNA recovery. Latent fingerprints deposited on copy paper by one donor were developed using three sequential processes: 1,8-diazafluoren-9-one (DFO) → ninhydrin → physical developer (PD); 1,2-indanedione-zinc (IND-Zn) → ninhydrin → PD; and IND-Zn → ninhydrin → Oil Red O (ORO) → PD. Samples were examined after the addition of each chemical treatment. DNA was collected with cotton swabs, extracted, quantified, and amplified. DNA yields, peak heights, number of alleles obtained, and percentage of DNA profiles eligible for CODIS upload were examined. DNA profiles were obtained with varying degrees of success, depending on the number and type of treatments used for latent fingerprint development. The treatments that were found to be the least harmful to downstream DNA analysis were IND-Zn and IND-Zn/laser, and the most detrimental treatments were DFO, DFO/laser, and PD. In general, as the number of treatments increase, the opportunities for DNA loss or damage also increase, and it is preferable to use fewer treatments when developing latent fingerprints prior to downstream DNA processing.     

Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana

In theory, granting politicians tools to oversee bureaucrats can reduce administrative malfeasance. In contrast, I argue that the political control of bureaucrats can increase corruption when politicians need money to fund election campaigns and face limited institutional constraints. In such contexts, politicians can leverage their discretionary powers to incentivize bureaucrats to extract rents from the state on politicians' behalf. Using data from an original survey of bureaucrats (N = 864) across 80 randomly sampled local governments in Ghana, I show that bureaucrats are more likely to facilitate politicians' corrupt behavior when politicians are perceived to be empowered with higher levels of discretionary control. Using qualitative data and a list experiment to demonstrate the mechanism, I show that politicians enact corruption by threatening to transfer noncompliant officers. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of public administrative deficiencies in developing countries and qualify the presumption that greater political oversight improves governance.