Beginn der 6-Monatsfrist des § 924 ABGB mit Annahmeverzug / Annahmeverzug bei Holschuld ab mündlichem Leistungsanbot

Die Frist des § 924 S 2 ABGB beginnt dann zu laufen, wenn der K?ufer oder Werkbesteller in Annahmeverzug ger?t; auf die (sp?tere) tats?chliche übergabe kommt es in diesem Fall nicht an. Liegt eine Holschuld vor (§ 905 Abs 1 ABGB), genügt ein mündliches Leistungsanbot zur Begründung des Annahmeverzugs. Für den Annahmeverzug ist es – im Zusammenhang mit der Beurteilung des Fristbeginns – ausreichend, dass die nicht angenommene Leistung prima facie mangelfrei ist.     

The 1972 Memorandum to the United Nations and its repercussions: Émigré politics and Soviet Estonian dissent during the ‘era of stagnation’

The Estonian dissidents’ Memorandum to the United Nations, drafted as a call for national self-determination in 1972, set new standards for the émigré community’s campaigns. Although its political message was initially dismissed as utopian, the subsequently emerging cooperation between émigré and homeland activists via intricate courier networks significantly strengthened the authority of Estonian voices in the West. By the early 1980s, the political alliances across the Iron Curtain eventually bore fruit. The Memorandum’s core demands reappeared in political debates on Baltic issues on both sides of the Atlantic, foreshadowing the massive Western support for the Baltic cause during the Singing Revolutions.     

Patent cross-licensing,the influence of IP interdependency and the moderating effect of firm size

This paper analyzes technological interdependency as the key factor for companies’ motivation to engage in cross-licensing transactions. It gives evidence on how the incentive effects for mutual technology transfers vary by firm size and the degree to which a firm has to rely on its competitors’ intellectual property (IP dependency). Even though IP dependency exists also among smaller firms, cross-licensing has previously only been analyzed for large firms. This paper fills this gap in the empiric literature using original survey data among German manufacturing companies. Findings suggest that the influence of firm size and IP dependency on the use of cross-licensing can not be regarded separately. While the effect of IP dependency on the relevance of cross-licensing itself has a clear positive effect this seems to be true to a higher extent for small firms and decrease for larger companies. A possible reason for the interaction effect between these two factors is that larger firms have better odds of achieving a technological workaround which can serve as an alternative to in- or cross-licensing; furthermore small high tech firms might need to explicitly use cross-licensing to secure the freedom to operate while a large firm’s patent portfolio itself can serve as an implicit insurance by posing a threat which prevents other technology holders to file patent infringement cases.