Critical Election in the Wake of an Economic and Political Crisis: Realignment of Icelandic Party Voters?

A critical election is generally defined as one in which the decisive results of voting reveal a sharp alternation of pre‐existing cleavage(s) and voting patterns, and the dealignment or realignment made between parties is lasting. A critical election can be caused by various factors and in this article the authors analyse whether the global credit crunch in 2008 set things in motion in Iceland, resulting in the 2009 election as a critical election. In that election, the electoral relevance of voters’ psychological attachment to parties and of ideological distances to them weakened, whereas party competence perceptions increased in importance for vote choices. Attachment to parties and ideological distances are factors that are generally stable and change slowly over time, while party competence is influenced by which issues are of importance at the time of the election. This indicates that, in 2009, a restructuring of the determinants of the vote occurred; a pattern of changes that is typical for a critical election. Evidence is found that the importance of party sympathy increases again in the 2013 election, indicating a realignment, rather than a dealignment, occurring in the wake of the 2009 election.     

Die proportionale Ministerienaufteilung in deutschen Koalitionsregierungen: Akzeptierte Norm oder das Ausnutzen strategischer Vorteile?

In this paper, we corroborate Gamson’s Law for a data set including German coalition governments on the federal and Länder level. We further tackle the question of how to explain this regularity. Here, we conclude that it is not the bargaining power of parties resulting from seat distribution that could be able to explain Gamson’s Law. In fact, we identify Gamson’s Law as a behavioural norm which evolved over time in Germany. We finally confirm the conjecture that on average smaller parties profit and larger parties suffer from deviations from Gamson’s Law. However, there is also a strong party bias which is able to invert this effect for single parties as e. g. the Greens or the Party of Democratic Socialism. Further variables such as the size of the party system or the number of parties which form a coalition government can also explain some deviations from the Gamson’s Law.     

Between European and national role conceptions – the EU3 initiative regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme

This paper addresses whether Germany, France and the UK (the EU3) – with the EU in the background – can shape their own approach to a common Europeanised position or even a European role conception regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme. As the EU3 initiative appears situated between Europeanisation and national role conceptions, it seems that the EU3 members – after a coherent start – were finally inclined to readapt themselves to certain of their national role conceptions, resulting in a “mix” of national and European role patterns in the process leading up to 2016. Currently, this mix hints at still-prevailing hindrances involved in genuine European conflict management, although this outcome holds the promise of greater European coherence in the future.

Abbreviations: E3: Germany, France and UK (without formal support of the EU); EU: European Union; EU3: Germany, France, UK and the “High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union”; EU3?+?3: official designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China; IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency; P5?+?1: informal designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China (Permanent Security Council Members [P5] plus Germany); UK: United Kingdom; UNs: United Nations; UNSR: Security Council of the United Nations     

Die politischen Konsequenzen der niedrigen Wahlbeteiligung bei der Europawahl 2009

If electoral abstention is linked to party preferences, low turnout—as witnessed in European Parliament elections—may hurt some parties and benefit others. In order to assess this possibility, we compare, in the member states of the EU, parties’ vote shares in the 2009 European Parliament elections with the results that would have been obtained had turnout reached the level of national general elections. We find that the effects of low turnout are minimal, and that—except for a single seat—higher turnout would not have resulted in a different composition of the European Parliament.     

Alles eine Frage des Managements?

NPM-driven agencification thoroughly changed the face of public administrations in many modern democracies. Despite high expectations and more than a decade of experience the effects of these reforms are still widely disputed. This contribution presents a neo-institutionalist model to evaluate empirically the explanatory power of those factors commonly considered as the most relevant for executives’ discretion in decision-making. Perception-data taken from the German federal administration confirm the hypothesized correlation between the distance from government and perceived discretion of agency executives. However, in-depth analysis reveals that some of the most common instruments to achieve autonomization fail to deliver.     

Policy representation

Abstract This paper examines the extent to which conditions for the 'representative party government' model of representation exist in the EU. It suggests that, although application of the model is obviously limited, there is some support for its relevance. Using surveys of voters and candidates for the European Parliament the paper shows that some policy positions of representatives are constrained more by their party group than their nationality, and to some degree there is obvious congruence between the opinions of candidates and their voters. This is particularly so with respect to left–right orientation; far less with respect to European Monetary Union where elites appear much more enthusiastic than their electorates.